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INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATBEE 
During the past eight years there has bean a consiler-
able resurgence of interest in the application of expectancy 
theory to the area of worker motivation, performance, satis­
faction, and vocational choice. Within this brief period, 
four major theoretical models (Vroom, 1964; Porter & Lawler, 
1968; Graen, 1969; Campbell, Dunnette, Lawlar, & Weick, 1970) 
incorporating these notions have appeared in the literature. 
Attempting to underscore the unique contribution of their 
particular model, each theorist has employed slightly differ­
ent terminology, and has emphasized somewhat different compo­
nents of their model. Nevertheless, the commonalities among 
the models far outweigh whatever discernible differences 
exist. 
This paper is concerned with these commonalities. More 
specifically, all four theories claim to explain and predict 
worker performance by specifying the construction of its 
motivational antecedents. The relevant variables and the 
manner in which they combine are the same. Vrooi's (1964) 
statement is not only the earliest of these, but also the 
most definitive. Conseguently, his model will be described 
in some detail in order to explicate the terms and relation­
ships with which these theories and this discussion deal. 
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Vroom's Model 
Basic to VrooiH's job perfocnance model is the 
recognition that a worker can potentially perform at a varie­
ty of output levels (first-level outcomes). rha molel sug­
gests that associated with each particular performance level 
is a set of both positive and negative consequences (second-
level outcomes). For example, the conseguencss a welder 
might associate with extremely high performance might be high 
pay, rapid promotions, and resentment from his co-workers. 
Conversely, with low performance, he might expect high co­
worker acceptance, more free time in which to socialize, 
lower pay, and reduced job security. In Vroom*s terms then, 
associated with each first level outcome (job performance 
level) are a number of second-level outcomes (consequences). 
Vroom specifies the manner in which these various conse­
quences combine to determine the desirability (valence) of 
each of the potential performance levels. 
The contribution any particular second-level outcome 
makes to the valence of the first-level outcome is a 
multiplicative function of two factors, valence and 
instrumentality. Valence refers to the expected satisfaction 
(or dissatisfaction) to be derived from an outcome; in the 
model valence is arbitrarily scaled to take on any value be­
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tween 10.0 and -10.0, If co-worker acceptancs is vary impor­
tant to the individual, the valence of this outcome is high, 
approaching 10.0. Valence would be zero if a worker were not 
concerned at all about co-worker acceptance. Conceivably, 
one could actually desire to be rejected by his peers, in 
which case the valence of co-worker acceptance wauli assume 
some negative value. 
The second concept relating second- to first-level 
outcomes is instrumentality. Instrumentality is an index of 
the perceived contingency between attainment of a particular 
performance level and actually receiving the associated 
second-level outcome. Instrumentality has bean scaled from 
1.0 to -1.0. ft high positive value suggests that a worker 
feels an outcome will likely be forthcoming if a certain per­
formance level is attained. If it is felt however, that an 
outcome is not related to performance, instrumentality ap­
proaches zero. Finally, if the possibility of receiving an 
outcome is precluded by performance at a certain level, 
instrumentality for this outcome will approximate -1.0. 
The contribution of any second-level outcome to the va­
lence of a particular first-level outcome can now be repre­
sented as the product of that outcome's valence and 
instrumentality. If pay is highly valent but not perceived 
to be related to performance (i.e., instrumentality equals 
zero), then the product will be near zero, and the contribu­
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tion of pay to the valence of performance levai will be neg­
ligible . Where co-worker acceptance is positively valent but 
high performance results in rejection by co-workars (i.a., 
negative instrumentality) , the product of valanca and 
instrumentality will be some negative value. This implies 
that the valence of performing at that level is actually 
reduced by the co-workec acceptance outcome. If we sum the 
products of valence (72) times instrumentality (I) across all 
second-level outcomes associated with a performance level, we 
arrive at a value which reflects the valence of performing at 
that output levai. Symbolically this is represented as 7= V2 
X I. 
Using the above equation, the valence of any performance 
level may be specified. However, we are not yet in a posi­
tion to predict the performance level actually chosen by an 
individual. K worker does not perforce strive to perform at 
that level possessing the highest valence. Vcoom introduces 
the concept of expectancy to explain this discrepancy. 
Expectancy "incorporates the common sense notion that 
only Don Quixote would reach for an unreachable star (Sraen 
1969, p. U) .«« It is an index of the perceived probability 
that a given performance level can be attained. If an indi­
vidual perceives that a highly valent performance level is 
unattainable because he lacks the requisite skills or 
abilities, or if environmental obstacles would thwart his 
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intentions, he will not be motivated to perfocm at that 
level. Instead, he will expend effort appropriate for a 
level of performance which he perceives attainable, albeit 
less valent. Expectancy is phrased in terms of a probability 
notion, ranging from 1.00, where the individual perceives the 
attainment of a performance level is assured, to 0.30, where 
the performance level is viewed as unachievable. 
Finally, Vroom contends there is a field of forces 
impinging on the individual corresponding to each of the po­
tential performance levels. The strength of eack force is 
determined by multiplying the valence of a performance level 
by its respective expectancy. The performance lavel having 
the largest expectancy-valence product exerts the greatest 
force upon the individual, and consequently is the output 
level chosen by tha individual. This relationship may be 
expressed as follows: P=E(V2xI). 
This account captures the expectancy theory approach to 
the understanding of worker motivation, which in turn trans­
lates through effort, into performance. All four theories 
cited earlier share the approach outlined above. While each 
model posits a more or less unigue set of additional rela­
tionships, all are derived from the basic expectancy approach 
as has been described. 
Before reviewing the more recent literature relevant to 
these theories, a brief account of the development of these 
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notions might serve to place the present approach in its 
proper perspective. 
Development of Expectancy Theory 
Thorndike's (1911) formalization of the ancient 
hedonistic doctrine in his statement of the "law of effect" 
provided the impetus for two major theories of motivation, 
drive x habit theory on the one hand, and expectancy x va­
lence on the other. Hull's (1943) drive x habit theory de­
scribed behavior as a multiplicative function of habits, S-B 
bonds established over time via the law of effect » and drive, 
which resulted from physiological need states. 
A somewhat different tact was taken by Tolman (1932) aad 
Lewin (1938). Finding the mechanistic behaviorist's approach 
to motivation somewhat sterile, Tolman (1932) introduced the 
"cognitive map" notion, and Lewin concaptualizad motivation 
in terms of expectancy x valence, although Tolman*s ideas 
were studied using primarily small animals, whereas Lewin * s 
theory dealt exclusively with human behavior, thay shared the 
view that the important determinants of behavior were to be 
found through investigation of an internal_cggnitive 
re&resentation_gf_the_external_environment. This representa­
tion took the form of expectancies that certain acts would 
result in specific outcomes, and differential prafarenca for 
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these various resultant outcomes. 
Aside from the terminological differences between 
Hullian and Expectancy Theory, a marked similarity remains in 
terms of their implications for behavior. As Porter and 
Lawler (1968) suggest, one is not "choosing between basically 
different approaches to motivation, because there is a strong 
similarity between drive and expectancy theory. Rather, it 
is a decision that involves trying to determine which of two 
similar approaches to motivation is most compatible with our 
thinking about the relationship between job attitudes and job 
performance" (p. 10). 
Several writers have made this decision easier by 
emphasizing the subtle differences which do exist between the 
theories (Vroom, 196!t; Atkinson, 1964; Porter and Lawler, 
1968) . First, drive theory is predicated on the 
establishment of S-B connections. Consequently one is at 
once concerned witk the reinforcement history resulting in 
the existing S-B bonds. In contrast, expectancy theory is 
distinctly ahistorical. Rather than deal with learned S-R 
relationships, expectancy theory focuses upon anticipation, 
the expectancy-outcome relationships extant at any point in 
time. The origin of these expectancies is not tceateu; in 
this sense it is future, rather than past oriented. 
A second distinction between the two approaches concerns 
the generality of behavior energized by expectancies on the 
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one hand, and drive on the other. Hullian theory views a 
goal ob-ject as a source of general excitement, resulting in a 
non-directive, pervasive influence on performance. In con­
trast, expectancy theory argues that anticipation of a valent 
outcome energizes only those behaviors which are perceived to 
lead directly to the attainment of the desired outcome. 
Finally, the major thrust of drive theory canters around 
the explanation and prediction of learning, whe;:eas 
expectancy theorists have more typically focused upon per­
formance. Where drive theorists account for learning as a 
result of the reduction of physiological drives or secondary 
reinforcement, cognitive theorists extend the discussion 
beyond physiological drive reduction, accounting for perform­
ance by reference to needs for achievement, esteem, and self-
actualization. 
With these distinctions in mind, most investigators of 
work motivation have found the expectancy theory framework 
preferable to drive theory. The terminology of the former 
theoretical position lends itself conveniently to discussions 
of attitudes, the major substance of work motivation. The 
emphasis of expectancy theory on more or less rational cogni­
tive activity underlying work behavior is consistent with 
traditional views of a "rational and economic man" (Katz S 
Kahn, 1966). Important motives like status, achievement, 
self-esteem, and power are dealt with easily within an 
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expectancy framework. &nd last, the emphasis on performance 
rather than learning places the discussion in a context imme­
diately familiar and relevant to the applied science of work 
behavior. 
Since the initial statements of Tolman (1932) and Lewia 
(1938), expectancy theories have generated research interest 
in primarily three areas within psychology: experimental, 
social, and industrial. Dulany's (1961, 1962, 1968) theory 
of prepositional control has provided the major impetus among 
experimentalists. Here expectancy notions have fairly suc­
cessfully accounted for a good deal of verbal conditioning 
data. In social psychology, the bulk of attention has been 
directed toward explaining attitudes (Peak, 1955; Rosenberg, 
1956; Atkinson, 1958). More recently, Fishbein (1957) has 
introduced a comprehensive statement which formalized 
expectancy theory in terms which lend themselves readily to 
the investigation of social psychological variables, i.e., 
attitudes, norms, attraction, etc. (See Wicker, 1969, or 
Mitchell 6 Biglan, 1971, for a comprehensive review of this 
literature.) 
The formal application of expectancy notions in 
industrial psychology had a somewhat belated start. It was 
not until 1957, when Georgopoulos, Mahoney, and Jones pub­
lished, "A Path-Goal Approach to Productivity," that any 
serious attempt was made to investigate work performance 
10 
within an expectancy framework. Georgopulas at il. investi­
gated the relationship between productivity and tha percep­
tion that high productivity would lead to the attainment of 
desired goals such as pay, co-worker acceptance, and 
promotions. The findings of this study, conducted in a 
household appliance manufacturing company, provided substan­
tial support for expectancy theory. Specifically, 
Georgopulas et al. found higher productivity among those 
workers who perceived a greater contingency between high per­
formance and the attainment of the goal objects. Secondly, 
for those individuals who, in addition, indicated a strong 
preference for the goal objects, the above relationship was 
even stronger. Thirdly, participants who felt they had con­
siderable freedom to set their own work pace evidenced the 
strongest expectancy performance relationship. 
All of the above findings are exactly what one would 
predict from Vroom's model, although the model had not at 
this point in time, been formally stated. In Vroom's (1964) 
terms, the first finding suggests that as the perceived 
performance-reward contingency (instrumentality) increases, 
so does performance. Secondly, as the valence of the associ­
ated outcomes or goals increases, performance also improves. 
Although admittedly a poor operationalization of the 
expectancy notion, Georgopoulos* et al. third finding sug­
gests that the individual's perception that ha can in fact 
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regulate his level of performance is an important determinant 
of actual performance. This too is specified in Vroom's 
model. 
Shortly after the publication of the Georgopulas' et al. 
(1957) study, Atkinson (1958) conducted an experimental in­
vestigation of some of the relationships elucidated therein. 
Atkinson ignored the effort-performance contingency 
(expectancy). Instead he focused upon the effects of valence 
and instrumentality on performance. College students 
competed for a monetary prize of $1.25 or $2.50 with a 1/20, 
1/3, 1/2, or 3/4 probability of winning. Performance was 
defined as the number of arithmetic problems correctly solved 
in a 20 minute session. Performance was higher in the high 
valence condition, where the $2.50 prize was offered. 
Contrary to expectancy theory however, an inverted (F function 
described the relationship between performance and 
instrumentality. The greatest number of problems were solved 
when the probability of receiving the cash prize was .5 
rather than in the .75 condition as expectancy theory would 
predict, Atkinson suggested this result was due to a 
decrement in achievement motivation as the probability of 
success either increased or decreased from maximum uncertain­
ty, i.e., .5. Atkinson concluded however that his results 
were in the main supportive of expectancy theory. 
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Both the Georgopoulos et al. and Atkinson studies drew 
upon expectancy notions to examine performance. However, at 
this point, no formal theory of work performance had ap­
peared. Rather Lewin*s expectancy notions had provided at 
best a convenient framework from which to exaaiaa parformance 
motivation. This lack of formal theory characterized 
industrial psychology in general, but was particularly true 
with regard to work behavior. Guion and Cottier (1965) iden­
tify this problem succinctly: 
It must be admitted that industrial psychology 
lacks a general theory of work; it lacks a more 
specific theory of the relationships of 
motivational constructs to the behavior of the in­
dividual and his job; and it lacks even a substan­
tial body of research explicitly aimed toward the 
development of such theories, . . . If the problem 
lies in the lack of relevance of existing theories, 
then the solution must surely lie in the design of 
research that will lead to a relevant theory (p. 
37). 
The studies just described constitute the research that did 
indeed lead to a "relevant theory." Vroom*s (1964) Model was 
the first formal attempt to synthesize expectancy notions 
into an explicit theory of work behavior. 
Two particularly significant aspects of Vroom's Model 
should be noted. First he translated expectancy notions into 
language immediately applicable to the work setting, fts a 
consequence, students of industrial behavior could ao longer 
easily overlook the potential contribution to their field 
offered by this approach. Secondly, and perhaps more impor­
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tantly, Vrooœ's propositions are stated with sufficient pre­
cision to permit specific behavioral predictions. This has 
generated a substantial number of investigations of certain 
portions of the Model (Hackman & Porter, 1968; Lawlar, 1968; 
Gavin, 1970) as well as studies aimed at testing the entire 
theory (Galbraith 5 Cummings, 1967; Graen, 1969; Mendel, 
1971). Furthermore, the more recent expectancy models of 
work motivation (Porter & Lawler, 1968; Graen, 1969; Campbell 
et al., 1970) are a direct result of the research stimulated 
by 7room*s Model. 
Recent Literature 
We are now in a position to examine the literature rele­
vant to the common elements of the four expectancy models of 
work performance. Each of the four expectancy models of work 
performance previously cited views a worker's motivation to 
perform as a function primarily of the interaction of three 
variables: 1) his perception of the probability that his 
task-related efforts will translate into effective perform­
ance (expectancy), 2) his perception regarding the probabili­
ty that rewards will be forthcoming given the attainment of 
some specified performance level (instrumentality) , and 3) 
the anticipated satisfaction to be derived from these rewards 
(valence). 
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Valeaçe_x_instrumentalitY 
Several investigations have dealt exclusively with the 
valence x instrumentality portion of the model, ft typical 
procedure is to collect questionnaire data regarding the va­
lence and instrumentality of one or more outcomes associated 
with the dependent variable under study, form the products as 
specified by the model, and arrive at a predicted performance 
score for each subiect. This predicted value is then corre­
lated with a self-report or external measure of the criteri­
on. With varied success, this procedure has been used to 
predict racial prejudice (Rosenberg, 1956), job satisfaction 
(Porter 5 Lawler, 1968), vocational preference (Sheard, 1971; 
Wannous, 1971), turnover (Dunnette, Arvey, 5 Banas, 1970), as 
well as job performance (Lawler, 1968; Galbraith & Cummings, 
1967; Lawler S Porter, 1967; Hackman S Porter, 1968; Spitzer, 
1964; Georqopoulos et al., 1957). 
Hackman and Porter (1968) had 82 female service repre­
sentatives of a telephone company indicate the outcomes they 
expected would result from working hard on the job. They 
also indicated the level of certainty these outcomes could be 
obtained by working hard (I) and an es:imate of the degree to 
which workers like or dislike these consequences (?). Com­
bining instrumentality and valence for these outcomes 
multiplicatively, the investigators were able to predict a 
composite criterion of work effectiveness (r=.40). Similar 
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results using this procedure to predict job performance have 
been reported by those cited above. 
Two issues regarding this portion of the moiel have been 
raised. First, there is a controversy regarding the value of 
weighting instrumentalities by their respective valences. 
Sheard (1971) and Hannous (1971) both report valance 
weighting did not improve prediction of student job prefer­
ence when compared with predictions made using 
instrumentalities alone. Ewen (1967) and Blood (1971) arrive 
at the same conclusion with regard to the prediction of job 
satisfaction. Blood, in a summary of his and Ewen's argu­
ments states: 
Ewen argued that differential weights did not make 
a difference (or, if yon prefer, that "importance" 
is not "important"). The present argument adds the 
consideration that when making judgements about the 
importance of job aspects, Ss provide information 
that has little relationship to the actual influ­
ence of those aspects on an overall evaluation of 
the job. It is unwarranted to expect people to 
behave in the methodical and orderly manner neces­
sary to provide data that would support the model 
of behavior implied by the original properties of 
the formula. The conception of importance is em­
pirically invalid (Blood, 1971, p. 433). 
In defense of 7room's propositions however, two points 
are worth noting. First, although Blood makes a general 
statement about the empirical validity of valence weighting, 
the data he refarences include only job satisfaction as the 
criterion. Thus, he may be correct with regard to that par­
ticular dependent measure, but this does not necessarily sug-
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qest his argument is valid for other dependent measures with 
which expectancy theory deals. Secondly, the fact that 
Galbraith and Cummings (1967), Lawler and Porter (1967), 
Spitzer (1964), and Georgopoulos et al. (1957) all report 
data in which valence weights did improve the prediction of 
performance, suggests Blood's statement is inieal ia need of 
qualification. 
The second issue concerns the direction of causality. 
Do subjects' perceptions of instrumentalities cause perform­
ance or are they determined by it? Almost all of the re­
search dealing with these relationships is of a static 
correlational nature. Consequently, there is a relatively 
small literature one can draw upon to answer these questions. 
There are two studies however, relevant to this point. The 
Atkinson (1958) study described earlier, in which 
instrumentality and valence were experimentally manipulated, 
did result in subsequent changes in performance. This sug­
gests instrumentalities cause performance. Unfortunately, 
Atkinson used objective rather than cognitive measures of 
instrumentality. To the extent these objective measures 
failed to correspond to the subjects' subjective 
instrumentalities, the data do not provide an appropriate 
test of the Modal. 
A more direct test of the causality issus sas conducted 
by Lawler (1968). Cross-lagged (Campbell & Stanley, 1963) in 
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conjanctioii with dynamic correlational analyses (Vroom, 1966) 
were performed on subjective instrumentality data, cross-
laqqed analysis is based on the assumption that if variable X 
causes variable ï, then chanqes in X ought to precede changes 
in I. In the context of the Lawler study, if 
instrumentalities cause performance, then instrumentalities 
measured at the same time as performance ought to correlate 
lower than with a performance measure obtained at some later 
date. Employing self-ratings of performance collected 
contiguously with the instrumentality measure and again a 
year later, correlations of .43 and .65 respectively result­
ed. These findings provide further evidence for the notion 
that performance is in part caused by instrumentalities. 
EXBeÇtançi_%>_Berformanaet_e%Eeçtançz_2>_rewardi 
Aside from translating expectancy notions into a lan­
guage which attracted the attention of students of work moti­
vation, Vroom's model made yet another contribution. His 
postulates formally recognized that there are in fact two 
theoretically and operationally distinct expectaacies which 
contribute to the motivation to perform. The first, which we 
have just discussed, is the expectancy that performance leads 
iThe arrow symbol used throughout this discussion 
signifies that the construct to the left of the arrow leads 
to or results in the outcome on the right of the arrow. 
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to rewards (I). The contribution of this cognition to moti­
vation, however, is moderated by the expectancy that effort 
will lead to performance (E). 
The reader need be cautioned at this point. The dis­
tinction this writer is making between two bodies of litera­
ture, the first dealing with performance-reward 
contingencies, and the second focusing upon the effort-
performance relationship is by no means clean. There is a 
large number of investigations in which these notions were 
confounded, i.e., those which have examined the effort-reward 
contingency directly while ignoring its two components. Nev­
ertheless, the finding of these studies too have provided 
some insight into the relationships with which this discus­
sion is concerned. 
Glass, Singer, and Friedman (1969), although not direct­
ly concerned with the effort-performance expectancy, report 
findings relevant to this issue. A predictable versus non-
predictable auditory stressor resulted in subjects in the 
non-patterned condition reporting a reduced expectancy that 
effort leads to performance. Following termination of the 
stressor, subjects were given a task on which to work and 
their performance recorded. Subjects who had been in the 
non-predictable condition, and thus had lower effort-
performance expectancies, also had poorer scores on the post-
treatment task. The authors accounted for this in terms of 
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the "psychic cost of adaptation to an environmental 
stressor," An expectancy theorist would argue that the 
reduced effort-performance expectation resulted in lower per­
formance. 
In a study of 154 managers from five different 
governmental and private organizations, Lawler and Porter 
(1968) found performance positively related to the expectancy 
that effort would result in reward. Unfortunately, a sepa­
rate measure of the effort-performance expectancy was not ad­
ministered. We can only speculate therefore as to the extent 
the effort-performance contingency alone contributed to the 
performance variance. Lawler and Porter do however, recog­
nize the need for research on this point; 
The model (Porter and Lawler, 1957) points out that 
the probability that effort will lead to rewards is 
a product of the probability that effort will lead 
to performance and the probability that performance 
will lead to the reward. Judging from the high 
correlations found in the present study, it appears 
that these managers did not tend to distinguish be­
tween the probability that effort leads to rewards 
and the probability that performance leads to 
rewards. This would indicate that for them the 
concern about whether effort was likely to result 
in performance was not a major factor, and that the 
manor concern was whether performance would result 
in rewards. This is, of course, an inference and 
may be an artifact of an approach which did not di­
rectly ask the manager to estimate the likelihood 
that effort would result in performance. Future 
studies are needed to examine this issue directly 
(p. 133). 
Schuster and Clark (1970), in a study specifically de­
signed to test portions of Porter and Lawler's (1968) model. 
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found the effort-performance expectancy an important and 
identifiable factor in performance motivation. 
In their research. Porter and Lairler found that the 
more an individual sees his efforts as leading to 
the attainment of a reward (pay), the more effort 
he will expend. He first sees his effort as 
leading to the desired reward, and then proceeds to 
exert effort which, if role perceptions are accu­
rate, will result in meaningful performance that 
will in turn lead to the desired reward of pay. 
For our survey population, on the other hand, 
our results led us to conclude that effort is im­
portant primarily because it is believed to result 
in performance. The individual first sees that his 
performance will lead him to the desired reward. 
Since he feels that effort expended leads to per­
formance, he will then exert effort which, if role 
perceptions are accurate, will result in performnce 
that will attain for him the desired reward of pay. 
Porter and Lawler suggested that in a popula­
tion such as the one we used, where effort is seen 
to lead to performance, it may be possible to drop 
effort from the theoretical model. They said: 
"Unfortunately we did not directly ask the managers 
to estimate the probability that effort on their 
part would result in good performance. If it were 
found in future studies, that this probability was 
always close to 1.0, then indeed it could ba 
dropped from the model. However, at this point, we 
still feel it may be relevant in many situations" 
(p. 88). He agree with Porter and Lawler that 
effort is relevant, and our research does not indi­
cate that it should be dropped from the modal (p. 
1 6 ) .  
Largely similar conclusions were reached by Lifter, 
Bass, and Nussbaum (1971). In addition, thay provide a pos­
sible explanation for the differential importance ascribed to 
the effort-performance contingency in the previous two stud­
ies. Thscc authors rsssosed that effnrt might contribute 
more to effective performance at lower managerial levels. 
This was based on the observation that line supervisors are 
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more directly involved with production than are their super­
visors. Consequently the effort expenied by a line supervi­
sor is more likely to translate directly into identifiable 
performance than an equal amount of staff supervisor's 
effort. Lifter et al. (1971) report two findings which sup­
port their hypotheses that managerial level moderates the 
effort-performance relationship. 
In their study of 92 line and 30 staff supervisors, a 
higher relationship was found between effort and overall job 
performance for line than for staff supervisors. Further­
more, effort expenditure was actually used as a factor in 
determining salary increases to a greater extant by managers 
of line supervisors than by managers of staff supervisors. 
Since it appears managerial level does moderate the effort-
performance relationship, the greater importance ascribed to 
effort-performance by Schuster and Clark may have been a 
result of having investigated subjects of a lower managerial 
level than did Lawler and Porter. 
In sum, it is apparent that the evidence relating 
effort-performance expectancies to performance is equivocal. 
This is in part due to the fact that an objective effort-
performance index has been employed rather than the individu­
als perception thereof. The issue has been further clouded 
by a failure to separate the effort-performance from the 
effort-reward expectancy. The causal role played by the 
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former perception, as well as adequate identification of var­
iables which moderate its effect, remain unclear. The major 
problem with this literature insofar as it relates to Vroom's 
model however, has yet to be mentioned. 
It may be recalled that 7room proposes expectancy 
combines multiplicatively with the valence of performance. 
More specifically, actual performance is a function of the 
interaction of the effort-performance expectancy and the va­
lence of some specified performance level (see Vroom, 1964, 
p. 17-18, Propositions 1 and 2). In the literature just 
reviewed we see attempts to evaluate expectancy by examining 
its main effects, when its hypothesized relationship is 
interactional. The inapplicability of this approach requires 
no further elaboration. 
In order to evaluate the theory appropriately, all vari­
ables must be considered simultaneously.% In the last body 
of literature discussed here, the authors have attempted to 
do so. 
ÇgmBlete_tests_gf_the_Mgdeli__Et_I^_and_V 
Galbraith and Cummings (1967) conducted the first inves­
tigation in which the stated objective was to test the 
adequacy of Vroom's job performance model. The correlational 
2The reader may refer to Heneman and Schwab (1972) for a 
more detailed account of this problem. 
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study was conducted in an operative industrial plant. Va­
lence and instrumentality measures were obtained from each of 
the 32 subiects for five second-level outcomes: wages, 
fringe benefits, promotion, group acceptance, ani supervisor 
support. Expectancy was assumed to equal unity since each 
worker could independently and autonomously regulate his own 
output. With these data the authors used a stepwise multiple 
regression procedure to determine which outcomes, if any, 
predicted performance. 
Supervisor support was the only significant variable. 
The first order interaction of instrumentality and valence 
for supervisor support was the only variable significantly 
related to performance. That is, neither valence nor 
instrumentality alone predicted job performance, but the 
product of these two variables did. While this one signifi­
cant effect is consistent with the model, why did the 
remaining hypothesized interactions fail to occur? Galbraith 
and Cummings account for this finding by arguing that the 
remaining second-level outcomes were not dependent on the 
worker's level of performance. They maintain that the par­
ticular organizational structure in which the study was 
conducted was such that wages and fringe benefits ware con­
trolled by union agreements, and promotion was largely a 
function of seniority. In short, the instrumentality of high 
productivity for the attainment of these second-level 
24 
outcomes was extremely low, thereby precluding any signifi­
cant effects for these variables. 
Two points are particularly noteworthy with ragard to 
this study. First, at the outset of the investigation the 
authors delineated three conditions which must bs satisfied 
if an organizational variable is to be a significant 
determinant of performance: 1) the outcome must be desired 
by the employee, 2) the employee must perceive that variation 
in performance will effect the amount or probability of 
second-level outcomes, and 3) the organization must be capa­
ble of varying the reward component. Unfortuaately, supervi­
sor support was the only one of the five outcomes that satis­
fied all three conditions. Moreover, the authors designated 
the relevant second-level outcomes, rather than allowing the 
subjects themselves to indicate the goals for which they 
performed. Thus, it appears Galbraith and Cummings failed to 
make any systematic attempt, by interviews, job analysis, 
etc., to identify the relevant second-level outcomes for the 
workers from whom the data were collected. Although the 
authors did report a substantial correlation between the pre­
dictor cited above and performance (r=,57), the potential 
efficacy of the model may well have been severely restricted; 
the input employed was for the most part inappropriate. 
h second important point concerns these authors* treat­
ment of expectancy. They tacitly assumed that expectancy 
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equalled unity in the particular work setting investigated. 
Even if one were to concede that the objective expectancy was 
as reported, it is inappropriate to use this index in the 
model. Vroom (196%, p. 17) emphatically states that it is 
the expectancy as perceived by the worker that is germane to 
the model. In the final analysis, one must conclude 
Galbraith and Cumminqs failed to provide an adequate test of 
Vroom's model. 
Mendel (1971) attempted a validity extension as well as 
suggesting a slight modification of Vroom's model. He noted 
that earlier attempts to determine the validity of Vroom's 
model were conducted either in actual industrial settings 
(Galbraith & Cummings, 1967; Hackman 5 Porter, 1968) or in 
"experimental simulations" of industrial environaents (Graen, 
1969). It was argued that there are no intrinsic character­
istics of the model which should restrict its utility solely 
to industrial environments; the model should be an equally 
powerful tool in virtually any performance setting. To test 
this notion, a collegiate wrestling team constituted the 
subject population. 
A second purpose was to test a proposed modification of 
the theory. Mendel and Dickinson (1971) stated that 
heretofore 
The model has been evaluated in terms of its 
ability to account for variations in performance. 
Without exception, the measure of performance pre-
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dieted was derived by some external, often called 
'objective' means, e.g., unit output records. The 
model Vroom espouses however, is distinctly cogni­
tive. Emphasis in all the independent measures is 
on the perceptions or cognitions of the individual, 
that is, self-rated valence, self-rated 
instrumentality, and self-rated expectancy. Hence 
it is with some trepidation that this author learns 
that in the quantification of the dependent vari­
able productivity, the perceptions of the focal in­
dividual are completely ignored. 
Is it not reasonable to view cognitively 
derived, self-perceived performance as an 
intervening variable between the motivational base 
and 'objective* performance? Vroom argues that a 
worker adjusts his performance to a force impinging 
upon him to attain a certain level of output. But 
performance for the individual is defined by his 
perceptual and cognitive processes. It therefore 
seems defensible that it is this cognitive index of 
performance that the worker adjusts to this force, 
and as a result it is this measure of performance 
that is in fact predicted by the sizable correla­
tion extant between self and other ratings of this 
variable (p. 2) . 
Before looking at the results of this study, two method­
ological improvements over the Galbraith and Cummings study 
deserve mention. First, the second-level outcomss used in 
this study (winning matches, making the varsity, respect of 
teammates, support from coaches, becoming too tired to study 
after practice), were defined by the subjects rather than by 
the experimenter. Secondly, although Mendel felt that 
expectancy might reasonably equal unity, a measure of the 
subjects' perceptions of this variable was taken. Thus the 
two major shortcomings of the Salbraith and Cummings study 
were avoided here. 
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When an external index of performance was used (coach-
ratings) as the criterion, Vroom's modal approached, but 
failed to reach traditionally acceptable levels Df signifi­
cance. However, the model did predict a self-rating of 
performance (8=.65, p<.025). Moreover, the amount of vari­
ance explained in the latter case was significantly greater 
(p<,01) than whan an external performance rating was used. 
The author concluded that this finding constituted substan­
tial support for his proposed modification of the theory. 
Incontrovertible evidence for the necessity of actually 
measuring subjects' expectancies was also obtained. When 
expectancy was deleted from the model, H*s of .12 and .1U for 
coach- and self-rated performance respectively resulted. 
This contrasts with R's of .32 and .U2 for the same two vari­
ables when actual expectancy measures were included in the 
prediction equation. It appears that subjects' perceptions 
of the effort-performance relationship do not necessarily 
correspond to reality as defined by a second party, whether 
the latter be the experimenter or a worker's superior. 
One obvious deficiency in Mendel's conclusion must be 
recognized. It is quite possible that the better prediction 
of self- versus coach-rated performance is due to differen­
tial method bias. Self-rated predictors would logically be 
expected to correlate higher with self- than coach-rated per­
formance since the former enjoys a common method, whereas the 
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latter does not. The method factor is inextricably 
confounded in this study, so definitive evidence for the sug­
gested modification has not been provided, it the very 
least, this question does warrant further investigation. 
The Mendel (1971) study probably offers the most com­
plete test to date of Vroom's Model. The findings constitute 
substantial support for this expectancy theory. The fact 
that the data were collected in a non-industrial setting 
makes the findings even more convincing. 
The evidence reviewed thus far warrants two broad con­
clusions. First, both the experimental and correlational 
data concerning the separate effects on performance of va­
lence, instrumentality, the valence x instrumentality inter­
action, and expectancy are consistent with expectancy theory 
in general, and Vroom's model in particular. However, as was 
pointed out, these findings are only tangentially relevant to 
Vroom's and the later expectancy models since these models 
deal with performance as a function of the interaction of the 
above variables. All of these variables must be considered 
simultaneously in order to generate data truly relevant to 
these models. 
The second conclusion derives from those correlational 
investigations iust discussed, which have with varying 
degrees of success, simultaneously considered all of the var­
iables in the model. These studies do offer moderately 
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encouraging support for the kinds of relationships suggested 
by Vroom. 
The obvious next step is the experimental manipulation 
of all variables in the model within a single paradigm. Only 
in this way can one -justify conclusions regarding the direc­
tion of causality, the nature of the interaction, and the 
relative amount of variation in performance attributable to 
each of the models' variables or combinations thereof. 
Only one attempt to conduct such an investigation is re­
ported in the literature. Arvey and Dunnette (1970) set out 
to determine if individuals do in fact distinguish between 
expectancy and instrumentality, and if they do, to establish 
the nature of the effect these two types of expectancies have 
on performance, although the valence of reward was not ma­
nipulated, this is the only study reported that kas manipu­
lated both expectancy and instrumentality. 
The expectancy manipulation involved informing subjects, 
who were solving math problems in groups of size ten, that on 
the basis of the number of problems correctly answered in a 
20 minute session, either the top two (low E), five (medium 
E), or eight (high E) of their number would be designated 
'•top performer." Subjects were also told that the "top 
performer" designates would subseguently have the opportunity 
to reach into a bowl containing red and white poker chips, 
selection of a red chip being worth two experimental psychol-
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oqy points. Instrumentality was manipulated by informing 
subiects that the bowl contained 25% red chips (low I) or 75% 
red chips (high I). Subjects were also blocked on the basis 
of math problem-solving ability. 
although much of Arvey and Dunnette's discussion con­
cerned the relevance of their findings for Atkinson's 
achievement motivation and Locke's goal setting notions, some 
implications for expectancy theory are discussed. First, 
Arvey and Dunnette note with particular enthusiasm that as 
expectancy increased, so did performance. Second, they found 
that, contrary to expectancy predictions, increases in 
instrumentality (i.e., performance-reward perception) were 
not-associated with higher performance. Third, and not too 
surprisingly, they report higher ability subjects actually 
did perform better. Fourth, no significant interactions re­
sulted for expectancy, instrumentality, and ability. This 
too is contrary to expectancy theory. Finally, and again 
counter to expectancy notions, effort did not relate more 
highly than performance to expectancy and instrumentality. 
On the surface, these findings offer little 
encouragement for proponents of expectancy theory. Upon 
closer inspection of Arvey and Dunnette's procedure, however, 
their findings appear uninterpretable. Arvey and Dunnette 
set out to separate and experimentally manipulate the effort-
performance and performance-reward expectancies. But it 
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appears they have really manipulated an ef|ort-raward rather 
than an effort-performance contingency. Recall that this 
latter manipulation involved varying the number of subjects, 
in a group of size ten, that would be designated "top 
performer." Certainly being designated "top performer" on 
the basis of performance on a 20 minute math test is a highly 
rewarding situation. This is especially so when you consider 
the designations were made in front of the group of peers 
with whom the subjects competed. Particularly in the high E 
condition where all but two of the subjects in the group 
would be "top performers" is the reward component extant. No 
doubt, for a group of college students performing an 
intellectual task, being singled out as one of the two group 
participants with the poorest score reflects mora then per­
formance. It is highly punishing (or rewarding) as well. In 
fact, it is likely that the reward component associated with 
the "top performer" designation was far greater than the in­
tended reward of "two experimental credits." 
If Arvey's findings are reconsidered with this criticism 
in mind, a very different set of conclusions are warranted. 
First, he has actually replicated the earlier finding that 
the effort-reward probability relates to performance. His 
second finding is consistent with this writer's hypothesis 
that relative to the "top performer" designation, two experi­
mental credits have little reward value; thus no effect for 
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the performance-reward manipulation resulted. Finally, the 
failure to obtain an interaction between expectancy and 
instrumentality is easily explained; neither of these cogni­
tions were manipulated correctly. Hence the need for an ex­
perimental analysis of the expectancy theory variables 
remains. 
Statement of Purpose 
An experimental approach to the analysis of Vroom's and 
related expectancy models was adopted a) to determine if the 
specified three-way interaction does predict performance, b) 
to compare the efficacy of the Model as an explanatory device 
for cognitive versus objective performance measures, and c) 
to determine the nature of the causal relationship between 
expectancies and performance. Additionally, several varia­
tions of and derivations from the Model were examined. 
Specifically, these were d) the degree of equivalence between 
effort -> reward and expectancy x instrumentality percep­
tions, and the implications of the use of each in the Model, 
e) the value of valence weighting, f) the effect of using 
cognitive rather than objective ability measures on the pre­
dictive power of the Model, and g) the success of the Model 
as a predictor of effort versus performance. 
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Hypotheses 
The first set of hypatheses are derived directly from 
the Model and thus represent tests of the relationships 
thereby specified. 
£E§âigtions_derived_froffl_Vroomls_Iiodel 
Hypothesis 1 : Vroom's Model, i.e., the product of 
expectancy, instrumentality, and valence predicts 
effort and performance. 
HY20thesis_2: Vroom's Model is a better predictor 
of effort than performance. 
Hypothesis 3: Vroom's Model more accurately 
predicts effort and performance when instrumentality is 
weighted by valence than when valence is deleted. 
Hypothesis 4; Vroom's Model more accurately predicts 
performance when the product of expectancy, instru­
mentality, and valence is multiplied by ability. 
HlEothesis_5: The product of perceived expectancy and 
instrumentality does not correspond to subjects' 
effort -> reward estimates. 
Hypothesis 5.1: Better effort and performance pre­
dictions result when the product of expectancy and 
instrumentality, rather than effort -> reward expec­
tancies are employed in the model. 
The hypotheses in the following section are based on the 
position that Vroom's Model, as a cognitive consistency 
theory, is more accurately characterized as a predictor of 
cognitive performance. 
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Predictions derived from modified model^ 
Hypothesis 6; Troom's Model is a better predictor 
of effort and performance when cognitive measures 
(self-report) are employed as both indépendant and 
dependent variables. 
Hypothesis 6.1: Vroom's Model is a better predictor 
of self-ratings of effort and performance than ex­
ternally derived measures of these constructs. 
HYEothesis_6.2: The product of Vroom's Model 
variables and self-rated ability more accurately 
predicts effort and performance than when exter­
nally derived measures are employed. 
3For expository convenience, the term "modified model" 
is used to describe Vroom's Model when evaluated against cog-
nitively derived measures of effort or performance. 
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HETBOD 
Overview 
Subjects were required to solve arithmetic problems 
under one of eight treatment combinations. The design was a 
2x2x2 factorial with two levels of expectancy (.60 and 
1.00), two levels of instrumentality (.25 and .75), two 
levels of reward ($1 and $5) , and ability serving as a 
covariate. 
Subjects 
Eighty male students enrolled in the Introductory Psy­
chology courses at Iowa State Oniversity and Western Kentucky 
University served as subjects. 
Task 
After a preliminary training exercise (described in Pro­
cedure) , subjects in a laboratory setting were asked to solve 
pairs of equations, and then to apply a decision rule to 
arrive at a final answer for each equation-pair. There were 
two successive 20-minute, problem-solving sessions. 
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Each sabiect was given three types of materials: 
1) a booklet containing 90 pairs of equations. Each 
equation pair was numbered consecutively and appeared in 
the following format (see appendix A): 
1. 8X - 4 + 2 = 
9X + 5 - 6 = 
2) a blank IBS Form 517 answer sheet (see Appendix B). 
3) a 4"x6" input card with a summary of the dscision 
rule at the top and ten "input values" listed below (see 
Appendix C). 
In order to solve each equation-pair, subjects first had to 
select the appropriate value from the input card. While an 
equation booklet contained seventy equation-pairs, the input 
card listed only ten values with the numeric labels "0" 
through "9." Therefore, subjects were instructed to reuse 
the input values as follows. Equation-pairs 1, 21, etc. 
were to be solved by substituting for X, the input value la­
beled "l." Likewise, the input value corresponding to the 
label "0," was to be used to solve equation-pairs 10, 20, 30, 
etc. In short, subjects had to attend only to the last digit 
in the eguation-pair number, and select the value from the 
input card with the same numeric label. 
Once the appropriate input was selected, subjects were 
required to substitute this value for X in both aquations in 
a pair. They than had to carry out the indicated arithmetic 
operations and write down the answers next to the equations 
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in the booklet, àt this point, subjects had to apply a 
decision rule. If the upper answer was larger or equal to 
the lower answer, they were to subtract the lower from the 
upper. Conversely, if the lower answer was larger, they were 
to add the two answers. In this way, a final two-digit num­
ber was computed for each eguation-pair. Only tlie last digit 
in this final answer for an equation-pair was recorded by 
blackening the corresponding digit on the IBM answer sheet. 
Manipulations 
Deception was used ta manipulate expectancy. In the 
high expectancy condition, subjects were told that all of the 
ten values on the input card were correct and thus if they 
personally carried out the arithmetic operations without 
error, 100 percent of their answers on the IBM answer sheet 
would be scored as correct responses. Subjects in the low 
expectancy condition were informed that only six of the ten 
inputs were correct, so the best they thought they could do 
was 60 percent of those equation-pairs solved correctly, al­
though subjects in both conditions were informed of the per­
centage of "incorrect inputs," they were not told which of 
the ten were supposedly in error. Consequently, the only 
performance maximization strategy was to work each and every 
problem as rapidly and accurately as possible. IS_fi2iafe_2f 
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faÇtt_inEuts_were_iaeatiçal_in_all_çgniitionsL_eveç%_iaEUt 
îîouia_have_resulted_ia_a_çgrreçt_resEonse_haa_subieçts 
Çgmmittea_ng_arlthmetiç_errors^ 
Instrumentality was manipulated by informing subjects at 
the outset of the experiment that the department had provided 
some funds for payment of subjects, but that these funds were 
not sufficient to pay all 80 subjects in this experiment. 
Consequently, a two step process would be used to decide who 
would receive a cash prize. Subjects were told that if the 
total number of equations correctly solved by their team fell 
above the bottom quartile on norms already obtained, they 
would have a chance to win a cash prize. Subjects in the 
hiqh instrumentality condition were told that if they fell 
above the bottom quartile, they could reach into an opaque 
sack (which they were shown) containing 75% red and 25% white 
poker chips. If they pulled out a red chip, each partner 
would receive the cash prize. A white chip meant no cash 
prize would be awarded. Low instrumentality subjects were 
qiven the same instructions except that a red chip meant no 
cash prize, whereas a white chip won. 
Subjects in the high valence treatments were told that 
the cash prize was $5, while a $1 prize was indicated for 
subjects in the low valence conditions. 
The covariate ability was assessed on the basis of 
subjects' performance on a pretest which was disguised as a 
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training exercise. 
Measures 
All subjects completed two questionnaires, ths first 
immediately prior to the onset of the problem-solving session 
(Appendix D), and a second at the end of 40 minutes of prob­
lem solving (Appendix E) . Both measured subjects' perceived 
expectancy, instrumentality, valence, ability, and effort-
reward probability. In addition, the post-qusstiotinaire 
asked subjects to indicate the amount of effort they had 
actually put forth in solving the equations, how well they 
thought they personally had actually performed, how well they 
thought their partner had done, whether they had set any par­
ticular goal for themselves at the onset of the session, and 
whether they would be embarrassed had they not performed well 
enough to surpass the bottom guartile cutoff. 
"Objective" measures of performance and effort were also 
obtained. Performance was defined as the number of equation-
pairs correctly answered by a subject during the sixty minute 
session. Effort was operationalized as the number of 
equation-pairs for which the subject had recorded a response, 
regardless of the precision. 
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Procedure 
A subiect siga-up sheet was posted in the psychology 
building. The study was identified as one concerned with 
dyadic problem solving. A two-hour time commitment was re­
quired; two subjects were allowed to sign up for each time 
slot. Two experimental participation credits, a minor aca­
demic inducement, were awarded for participation. 
When both subjects arrived in the laboratory, they were 
seated at a table and the experimenter read aloud the follow­
ing instructions: 
In this study we are attempting to simulate certain 
aspects of a typical industrial work environment. 
As you know, the behavior of workers in industry, 
as well as the rewards these workers receive, such 
as pay, promotions, and so forth, are based in part 
on the abilities and skills of the individual 
worker, and in part on pure chance or luck. 
Moreover, often the behavior of one worker is par­
tially dependent upon the cooperation of one or 
more coworkers, as would be the case for example, 
in an assembly line job. It is the influence of 
these kinds of variables that are of interest in 
this study. A more detailed explanation will be 
given to you at the conclusion of this session, 
roughly an hour and a half from now. 
When both subjects indicated they understood what they were 
to do, the experimenter read the following: 
In order that I may be absolutely certain you 
understaîîâ how you are to solve the 
equation-pairs, and to obtain an estimate of your 
ability to solve this type of problem, you will 
have eight minutes to solve equations exactly as 
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you will be doing during the test sessions. Please 
work as rapidly and accurately as you possibly can. 
Your goal should be to solve correctly as many of 
the thirty equation-pairs in eight minutes as you 
are capable of doing. I will stop you when eight 
minutes have elapsed. 
Both subjects were then given a problem booklet containing 
thirty equation-pairs, an input card, and an IBM answer 
sheet. They were instructed to begin. 
After eight minutes, subjects were told to stop. Each 
was then given a blank input card and instructed to transfer 
his answers for the first ten problems from the IBM answer 
sheet to the input card. When this was done, the experimen­
ter collected the input cards and a single "instructional" 
treatment combination was administered to both subjects: 
For the next hour the two of you will be solving 
equations exactly as you have just done. The hour 
will be divided into three 20-minute sessions. At 
the end of the first and second sessions*, I will 
collect your equation booklet and answer sheet, and 
give you another set to work during the next 20 
minutes. Each booklet will contain 90 equation 
pairs, more than you will be able to solve in the 
allotted time. 
The two of you will be working as a team, but 
in separate rooms. At the end of the third ses­
sion, I will score all the answer sheets and total 
the number of equations the two of you together 
have solved correctly. 
There is one catch, however. The inputs you 
will be using to solve the equations are the 
order to avoid the increase in pprfnrmance frequent­
ly observed toward the end of a work period (ffyatt, Langdon, 
6 Scott, 1937), subjects were told that there would be three 
20-minute sessions when, in fact, there were only two. 
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answers your partner just recorded on the blank 
input card. The correct solutions to the equation-
pairs you will be solving during the next hour were 
computed by substituting in for "X" the correct so­
lutions to the equations your partner just solved. 
What this means, for example, is that if your 
partner got five of the first ten wrong on the 
pretest, you will be able to get at most 50% of the 
equation-pairs you solve correct. On the other 
hand, if he made no errors, you will get every 
equation-pair you solve correct as long as you 
personally do not commit an arithmetic error. I 
will note the number of incorrect inputs your 
partner has given you at the top left-hand corner 
of the input card. You will not know, however, 
which particular inputs are incorrect. Since you 
won't know which inputs are incorrect, your best 
performance maximization strategy is to work each 
and every equation-pair as rapidly and accurately 
as possible. How hard you work is entirely up to 
you. Do not try to second guess the task by re­
calling your own input responses, for the problems 
you just solved were of equal difficulty, bat the 
correct solutions were different. Thus, each of 
you will be working with somewhat different inputs. 
Do either of you have any questions? 
In order to make this a bit more interesting, 
the department has provided me with some funds to 
pay subjects. However, these funds are not suffi­
cient to pay all participants. Therefore, I have 
established performance norms for this task. If 
your combined score falls above the bottom 25%, as 
three out of four teams have, you will have a 
chance to win $10 ($2 in low V condition) , to be 
divided equally between you. If you make the 25% 
cutoff, and if you try at all you will, one of you 
may reach into this bag and pull out one chip. The 
bag, as you can see (subjects shown a bag contain­
ing 15 red and 5 white poker chips) contains 15 red 
and 5 white chips. If you pull out a red chip 
(white chip in low I condition), I'll immediately 
give each of you $5 in return for your signature on 
a receipt indicating you did receive the money. 
If, however, you pull out one of the five white 
chips, neither of you will be paid, but of course, 
ycu yill still receive ynnr two participation 
credits. 
Incidentally, I will tell you your team score, 
but not how much each of you contributed to that 
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score since that might lead one of you to fael 
inferior. In any event these scores would be mean­
ingless since each of you partially determines your 
partner's score through the inputs you provide each 
other.s 
Are there any questions? 
I will now place each of you in a separate 
room, give you your input sheets and a brief ques­
tionnaire to complete. This questionnaire, as you 
will see, is designed in part to make certain you 
have understood these rather lengthy and 
complicated instructions. Please fill out this 
questionnaire carefully. If you don't understand 
any of the questions, be sure to ask for 
clarification. When you have completed the ques­
tionnaire, I'll give you the equation booklet and 
the first 20-minute session will begin. 
To discourage random responding to unfinished equations 
during the closing minutes of each twenty minute session, 
subjects were relieved of their watches. They ware then di­
rected to separate rooms. Meanwhile, the experimenter 
discretely substituted a standard input card for those previ­
ously completed by the subjects. This input card was identi­
cal for all subjects except for a number at the top, 
supposedly indicating the number of incorrect inputs. In the 
low expectancy condition the number appeared, while a "0" 
appeared in the high expectancy treatment. The experimenter 
then entered the first test room, handed the subject ehat the 
latter thought were "partner generated inputs," and while 
^Subjects were so inforssed in order to minimize any 
reward (or punishment) component associated with performance, 
independent of externally mediated reinforcement. 
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pointing to the score, announced the number of errors his 
partner had committed. Experimenter then stated, "Nov you 
understand this means that if you personally make no errors 
whatsoever during the next sixty minutes, 60% (100% in high 
expectancy condition) of your aaswers will be correct, and 
thus count toward your total team score." The subject was 
then given the Preliminary Questionnaire to complete. The 
experimenter repeated this procedure for the second subject. 
As soon as both subjects completed their questionnaires, 
they were given the problem booklet and reminded that the ex­
perimenter would return in 20 minutes with another answer 
sheet and problem booklet. 
At the end of the first session, the experimenter en­
tered each test room, collected the answer sheet and problea 
booklet, and gave the subject a new set. He reminded 
subjects that he would return in 20 minutes with the third 
set. 
When the second session had ended, the experimenter 
again entered the room, this time with the Post Questionnaire 
in his hand. He collected the answer sheet and test booklet 
and stated: "Now that you have been working at this task for 
40 minutes and have gained some experience, I would like you 
to fill out this questionnaire. It is very similar to the 
one you already filled out. Try to answer each question as 
you feel right now, rather than trying to recall your earlier 
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responses. They may, of course, be the same. Take your tiie 
and answer carefully. When you have answered all the ques­
tions, the third 20-minute session will begin," 
When both subjects had completed their questionnaires, 
they were told the experiment was over. They were debriefed, 
each paid $3, and sworn to secrecy. 
Analyses 
All data were converted to deviation scores to eliminate 
spurious correlations between column means. A Certainty 
transformation was performed on all cognitive measures in 
order to reduce the effects of individual differences in re­
sponse style on the pre- and post-questionnaires (Liu, 1971). 
Several preliminary analyses were conducted to assess 
the effectiveness of the experimental manipulations. Four 
separate ANOVA's were run on the preliminary self-ratings of 
expectancy, instrumentality, valence, and perceived effort -> 
reward probability. 
A determination of the adequacy of Vroom's Modal as a 
predictor of effort and performance was made by employing two 
different strategies. Initially, with the treatment manipu­
lations as design factors, a 2^ ANOCOV with ability as a 
covariate was computed on each of the four dependent variates 
(i.e., cognitive and objective measures of both effort and 
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performance). Subsequently, each of the four dependent 
variates was regressed on the cognitive measures of all Model 
variables and their first- and second-order interactions and 
a partial F-test performed on the predicted 3-way interac­
tion. 
A partial F-test was used to determine whether Vroom's 
Model yields a better estimate of performance when the cogni­
tive measures are multiplied by ability. 
The correspondence between effort -> reward estimates 
and the product of expectancy and instrumentality was deter­
mined by a test of significance of the Pearson Product-Moment 
Correlation (r) between these variables. 
Partial F-tests were used to determine whether effort -> 
reward or the product of expectancy and instrumentality con­
tributed more to the ability of the Model to predict effort 
and performance. Employing the preceding test, several pair-
wise comparisons were made to determine whethar cognitive or 
obiective measures of both independent and dependent variates 
result in better prediction (Hypothesis 6). 
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RESULTS 
Check on Experimental Manipulations 
The results of the three-way ANOV& on expectancy are 
shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Summary of the analysis of variance of cognitive 
expectancy as a function of the treatment manipulations. 
Source df MS 
Expectancy (E) 
Instrumentality (I) 
Valence (V) 
E X I 
E X V 
I X V 
E X I X V 
Error 
total 
»*i<7ôï 
72 
"79" 
64695.87 
87 57.15 
1647.10 
456.02 
15207.69 
17257.95 
599.52 
6261.15 
10.333** 
1.399 
0.263 
0.073 
2.429 
2.756 
0.096 
The experimental manipulation was highly effective in 
influencing cognitive expectancy (g<.001). The mean high and 
a s  
low expectancies were 78 . 555 and 65.2% respectively.® Howev­
er, it is also evident that cognitive expectancy, while 
influenced by the objective probability (100% and 60%) never­
theless does differ from the latter. Moreover, inspection of 
the remaining entries in Table 1 reveals that cognitive 
expectancy was unaffected by any other experimental manipula­
tion or interaction thereof. Only the expectancy manipula­
tion affected cognitive expectancy. 
Table 2 displays the results of the instrumentality 
ANOVA. 
Table 2. Summary of the analysis of variance of cognitive 
instrumentality as a function of the treatment manipulations. 
Source df MS 
Expectancy (E) 
Instrumentality (I) 
Valence (V) 
E X I 
E X V 
I X V 
E X I X V 
Error 
total 
**g<7ÔÏ 
72 
"79' 
UOtV.99 
257644.aO 
414.03 
7527.16 
1361.26 
684.48 
378.46 
906.48 
0.447 
284.225** 
0.457 
3.304»* 
1.502 
0.755 
0.418 
*The actual ANOVA was conducted on the Certainty 
transformed data. Since the tests on both the raw and 
transformed data were highly significant, the raw score means 
are reported for ease of iuterpretability. The respective 
transformed means are 340.32 and 283.45. 
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Here too the manipulation was effective. Subjects in the 
high instrumentality condition reported higher 
instrumentalities than did those in the low instrumantality 
condition (2<.001). The mean cognitive instrumentalities 
corresponding to the 75% and 25% objective instrumentality 
conditions were 69.6% and 27.5% respectively (respective 
Certainty transformed means were 285.8 and 172.3). The 
instrumentality manipulation also resulted in a significant 
expectancy x instrumentality interaction (g<.01). Inspection 
of the means revealed this effect was due to the dominant in­
fluence of objective instrumentality over expectancy as a 
determinant of cognitive instrumentality. Plotted from low 
to high instrumentality, the positive slope for the low 
expectancy condition was greater than that for the high 
expectancy condition. 
The final manipulation, that of valence, was also suc­
cessful. The results of this âNOVA are displayed in Table 3. 
Subjects in the five dollar condition indicated they valued 
the cash reward to a greater extent than did subjects in the 
one dollar condition (g<.001). The means were 67.5 and 38.5 
respectively (corresponding Certainty transformed means were 
300 1AA.7). As was the case with expectancy, cognitive 
valence was affected exclusively by the valence manipulation. 
& final manipulation check was conducted using cognitive 
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Table 3. Summary of the analysis of variance of cognitive 
valence as a function of the treatment manipulations. 
Source df MS 
Expectancy (E) 
Instrumentality (I) 
Valence (V) 
E X I 
E X V 
I X V 
E X I X V 
Error 72 
"79' 
16336.75 
871.19 
247752.70 
5511.18 
8 0 8 0 . 2 2  
11712.67 
1729.77 
8203. 16 
0.772 
0. 106 
30.202*» 
0.672 
0.985 
1.428 
0 . 2 1 1  
total 
**i<7ôî' 
effort -> reward probability as the dependent variable. The 
results of this ANO?A are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Summary of the analysis of variance of cognitive 
effort -> reward as a function of the treatment manipulations. 
Source df MS 
Expectancy (E) 
Instrumentality (I) 
Valence (V) 
E X I 
E X V 
I X V 
E X I X V 
Error 
total 
72 
"79" 
4820.49 
83526.94 
70.32 
3794.99 
4636.00 
5.51 
154.01 
4250.30 
1.134 
19.652** 
0.017 
0.893 
1.091 
0 . 0 0 1  
0.036 
**£<.01 
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The only design factor affecting cognitive effort -> reward 
probability was the instrumentality manipulation. Subjects 
in the high instrumentality condition reported higher effort 
-> reward probabilities than did low instrumentality Ss 
(E<.001). The mean cognitive effort -> reward probabilities 
for the high and low instrumentality conditions were 60.5 and 
36.2 respectively (263.5 and 199 for Certainty transformed 
data) . 
The previous finding is particularly interesting in view 
of the fact that several published studies are predicated on 
the assumption that effort -> reward probability is 
isomorphic with the product of expectancy and instrumentality 
(Hackman and Porter, 1968; Gavin, 1970; Lawler, 1966, 1968; 
Lawler and Porter, 1967; and Porter and Lawler, 1968). While 
this assumption appears well justified both theoretically and 
rationally, the present investigation offers no empirical 
support to this notion. On the contrary, cognitive effort -> 
reward probability was solely determined by the 
instrumentality manipulation. 
In sum, while there was considerable error in the 
subjects' cognitive effort -> performance expectancies {r=.3U 
between objective and cognitive expectancy), and in their 
cognitive performance -> reward instrumentalities (r=.88 be­
tween objective and cognitive instrumentality), the results 
do suggest that subjects differentiate between expectancy and 
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instrumentality (cf. Lawler S Porter, 1967). More important­
ly, the experimental manipulations of expectancy, 
instrumentality, and valence were all successful. 
Hypothesis 1 
The results of the covariance analysis on objective 
effort and performance are shown in Tables 5 and 6 respec­
tively. 
Table 5. Summary of the analysis of covariance of objective 
effort as a function of the treatment manipulations 
Source df MS F 
Expectancy (E) 1 0. 58 0. 011 
Instrumentality (I) 1 25. ttit 0. 196 
Valence (?) 1 10. 97 0. 21U 
E X I 1 0. 20 0. 001 
E X V 1 25. 97 0. 507 
I X V 1 6. 54 0. 128 
E X I X V 1 7. 01 0. 137 
Error 70 51. 27 
Based on a strict interpretation of Vroom's Model, the 
second-order interaction should be significant, with no 
firct-crdsr interaction? or main effects. However, the anal­
ysis did not reveal any significant design factor effects on 
either objective effort or performance. 
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Table 6. Summary of the analysis of covariance of objective 
performance as a function of the treatment manipulations. 
Source df MS F 
Expectancy (E) 1 0.59 0.009 
Instrumentality (I) 1 25.12 0.378 
Valence (V) 1 16.47 0.248 
E X I 1 2.68 0.043 
E X V 1 27.54 0.415 
I X V 1 54.55 0.822 
E X I X V 1 3.39 0.051 
Error 70 66.38 
Similarly, as is shown in Tables 7 and 8, the covariance 
analyses did not indicate any significant affects for any of 
the manipulations on either cognitive effort or performance. 
Table 7, Summary of the analysis of covariance of cognitive 
effort as a function of the treatment manipulations. 
Source df MS F 
Expectancy (E) 1 195.23 0.951 
Instrumentality (I) 1 271.03 1.320 
Valence (V) 1 0.91 0.004 
E X I 1 692.66 3.37 
E X V 1 50.99 0.248 
I X V 1 23.69 0.115 
E X I X V 1 572.49 2.787 
Error 70 205.38 
5U 
Table 8, Summary of the analysis of covariance of cognitive 
performance as a function of the treatment manipulations. 
Source df MS F 
Expectancy (E) 
Instrumentality 
Valence (V) 
E X I 
E X V 
I X V 
E X I X V 
Error 
(1) 
70 
634.31 
4.87 
40.30 
0.34 
32.88 
65.77 
45.56 
295.59 
2.145 
0 .  016  
0. 136 
0 .001  
0 . 1 1 1  
0 .  222  
0. 154 
The regression analyses of objective effort ani perform­
ance on cognitive expectancy, instrumentality, valence, and 
their first- and second-order interactions offer no support 
for Vroom's Model. None of the partial F-tests ïas signifi­
cant for any of the component variables. Furthermore, 
contrary to 7room*s Model, the three-way interaction (E x I x 
V) was not the first of the Model variablesentering a 
stepwise regression. 
When cognitive effort was regressed on all Model vari­
ables, a somewhat more encouraging finding emerged. Of the 
seven Model components on which effort was regressed, the 
predicted second-order interaction was indeed the first vari­
able which entered the stepwise regression. The amount of 
variance explained by this single predictor wis significant 
(r=.24, F=4.63, df=1/78, £<.025). However, the partial F-
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test on this interaction when all seven variables were en­
tered did not reach traditionally acceptable levels of sta­
tistical significance (F=1.92, df=1/70, gX.IO). These 
results therefore, although somewhat equivocal, are 
suggestive of the triple interaction predicted by the theory. 
Data further indicative of the hypothesized interaction 
were obtained from the regression of cognitive performance on 
the Model variables. Again the second-order interaction was 
the first of the seven predictors to enter the stepwise 
regression. & significant amount of cognitive performance 
variance was explained by this interaction (r=.28, F=6.67, 
df=1/78, £<.025) , 
Unlike the regression on cognitive effort however, the 
partial F-test on the predicted interaction with all vari­
ables entered was significant with respect to cognitive per­
formance (F=6,58, df=1/70, g<.025). Consequently, Vroom's 
Model is supported as an explanatory device for understanding 
cognitive performance. 
In sum. Hypothesis 1 was confirmed for the cognitive de­
pendent measures, but was not supported for the objective 
variables. 
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Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2, stating that Vroom's Model is a better 
predictor of effort than performance, was not supported. Due 
to the extremely high correlation between the objective meas­
ures of effort and performance (r=.93), the result could not 
have been otherwise in the present study. In essence these 
constructs were not identifiably different. 
The failure to support Hypothesis 2 in the case of cog­
nitive effort and performance however, cannot be explained in 
the same manner since the correlation between these two con­
structs was considerably lower (r=.36). In fact, the model 
predicted cognitive effort less accurately (r=.2%) than cog­
nitive performance (r=.28), although the difference was not 
significant {F=1.02, df=1/77, b>.05). 
Hypothesis 3 
Higher correlations were predicted (Hypothesis 3) be­
tween the four dependent measures and E x I x V (Vroom's 
Model) than with the product E x I without valence weighting. 
Table 9 presents the correlations relevant to this hypothe­
sis. 
The correlation between Vroom's Model and the dependent 
variables was larger in all four cases. Partial F-tests were 
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Table 9. Correlations of valence weighted ani non-valence 
weighted models with cognitive and objective effort and 
performance. 
Cognitive Objective Cognitive Objective 
Effort Effort Performance Performance 
E X I X V .2375* .1364 .2817** .1456 
E X I .1706 .0750 .0502 .1191 
*B<.05 
**E< .01  
computed only for the cognitive dependent measures however, 
since neither of the objective dependent variables was sig­
nificantly related to either model. The partial F-test on 
cognitive effort was not significant, while that for cogni­
tive performance did reveal that Vroom's Model was a better 
predictor than the valence deleted model (F=3.U8, df=l/77, 
E<.05)f In sum, the data offer weak support for the hypothe­
sized superiority of valence weighting. 
Hypothesis 4 
The present study revealed no evidence to support 
Hypothesis 4. The product of Vroom's Model (E x I x V) and 
one-tailed test was performed. 
58 
ability (A) did not more accurately predict performance than 
did E X I X V alone, as inspection of the relevant correla­
tions in Tables 9 and 11 reveals, in no case did the addition 
of ability, whether derived objectively or cognitively, in­
crease the correlation with either objective or cognitive 
performance. In fact, the addition of ability actually 
attenuated the obtained correlation in all four instances. 
Hypothesis 5 
The hypothesis that the product of perceived expectancy 
and instrumentality does not correspond to subjects' effort 
-> reward estimates was confirmed. The obtained correlation 
between these two variables was not significant (r=.18, 
df=79, jo>.05) . 
Hypothesis 5.1 
Hypothesis 5.1 stated that better effort and performance 
predictions result when the product E x I rather than effort 
-> reward expectancies are employed in the Model. Table 10 
displays the correlations of the four dependent variables 
with each of the two models described above. 
Each of the four correlations between the prescribed 
model (E X I X V) and the dependent variables is considerably 
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Table 10. Correlations of Vroom's and effort -> reward 
models with cognitive and objective effort ani performance. 
Cognitive Objective Cognitive Objective 
Effort Effort Performance Performance 
E X I X V .2375* .1364 .2817** .1456 
Eff->Rew X V .0137 -.0040 .1224 .0296 
*E<.05 
•*2<.01 
larger than the corresponding relationship with the inappro­
priate model (effort -> reward x V). Since, as discussed 
earlier, the correlations between Vroom's Model and the ob­
jective measures of effort and performance were not 
statistically significant, the relationship between E x I x V 
and these dependent measures was perforce not significantly 
larger than when effort -> reward was substituted in the 
Model. Nevertheless, the differences were in the predicted 
direction for both objective effort and performance. 
A comparison of the above two models when the cognitive 
dependent measures were used produced more definitive 
results. With cognitive effort as the dependant measure, the 
resulting correlation with E x I x V was inJeed significantly 
larger than that obtained when the effort -> reward estimate 
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replaced E x I in the Model (F=4.09, df=1/77, g<,025).® The 
difference between the two models with regard to cognitive 
performance approached traditionally acceptable levels of 
statistical significance (F=2.07, df=1/77, gK.OS).* la sum, 
the evidence lends support to the hypothesis that better 
effort and performance predictions result when Vroom's Model 
is operationalized as originally stated rather than 
substituting effort -> reward estimates in the Model. 
Hypotheses 6 and 6.1 
Hypothesis 6 stated the general principle that better 
prediction of effort and performance results when cognitive 
measures are employed both in the Model and as dependent 
variates. Two testable hypotheses were derived from this 
principle. First, the Model is a better predictor of cogni-
one-tailed test was performed. 
'One factor which may have contributed both to the dis­
crepancy between cognitive and objective contingencies and to 
within treatment variations among subjects is the fact that 
the subjects serving in the present study were drawn from two 
relatively diverse college populations. The extent to which 
Western Kentucky University students differ systematically 
from those at Iowa State University on dimensions which might 
affect the ontrnmm of this investigation is unknown. In any 
case, such differences, while possibly increasing the amount 
of error variance, definitely broaden the generalizability of 
the findings. 
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tive effort and performance than externally derived measures 
of these constructs. A partial F-test was used to determine 
whether the Model was a better predictor of cognitive than 
objectiTe effort. Although the correlation between the Model 
and cognitive effort (r=.24) was larger as predicted, than 
that with objective effort (r=.14), the difference between 
these correlations was not significant (F=.48, df=1/77, 
B>.05). 
Parallel results were obtained with cognitive and objec­
tive performance. Again the correlation between the Model 
and cognitive performance (r=.28) was larger than that with 
objective performance (r=.14), but the difference was not 
statistically significant (F=.98, df=1/77, g>.05). 
Hypothesis 6.2 
Hypothesis 6.2 stated that the product of the Model and 
cognitive ability more accurately predicts effort and per­
formance than does the utilization of externally derived 
measures of ability. Table 11 displays the correlations be­
tween both the objective and cognitive models and the four 
dependent variables. Because neither of the above models 
correlates at all with either objective effort or performance 
(a finding consistent with Hypothesis 6.1), no further sig­
nificance tests were conducted on these relationships. 
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Table 11. Correlations of the product of Vroom's Model 
and cognitive vs. objective ability with cognitive and 
objective effort and performance. 
Cognitive Objective Cognitive Objective 
Effort Effort Performance Performance 
Ac I E X I X V .1830 .0052 .2524* .0133 
AO K E X I X V .1020 .0128 .1620 .0150 
*p<.05 
However, the relationships between the two models and 
the cognitive dependent measures were subjected to further 
analyses. 
Once again the predicted larger correlation resulted be­
tween the cognitive model and effort (r=.18), rather than be­
tween the objective model and effort (r=.10). However, the 
difference between the correlations was not significant 
(P=.25, df=1/77, g>.05). 
Precisely the same result was obtained when evaluating 
the two models against cognitive performance. The correla­
tion with the cognitive model was larger (r=.25) than that 
with the objective model (r=.16), but the diffarance between 
them failed to reach statistical significance (F=.90, 
df=1/77, £>.05). In sum, although Hypotheses 6.1 and 6.2 
«fere no+ s+rirtly confirmed, the fact that all four relation­
ships were in the hypothesized direction offers weak support 
for the position that cognitive rather than objective meas­
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ures are more appropriate both as Model and dependent vari 
ables. 
6U 
DISCUSSION 
The findings of the current study are discussed in the 
same sequence as their presentation in the Results. The 
initial comments deal with the implications of the check on 
treatment manipulation effectiveness, followed by an evalua­
tion of the findings pertaining to the hypotheses. Discus­
sion of the causality issue and the psychometric limitations 
of evaluations of Vroom's Model concludes this section. 
Experimental Manipulations 
The overall success of the treatment manipulations dem­
onstrates that Vroom, as well as other expectancy theorists, 
is correct in his assumption that individuals are aware of 
the environmental contingencies existing between effort and 
performance, and performance -> reward. This assumption is 
germane to a rational model which seeks to explain human mo­
tivation in terms of the interactive effects of these 
contingencies. Yet, the present study also reveals that even 
in a situation where the actual contingencies were explicitly 
defined, the subjective representation of these relationships 
does not precisely parallel the objective probabilities. 
The discrepancy described above was particularly 
apparent with respect to the expectancy manipulation. Al­
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though the manipulation was highly successful, the reported 
expectancies differed markedly from the experimentally 
defined contingencies. Aside from the attenuation due to the 
unreliability of the expectancy measure (r=.59), it is possi­
ble that this discrepancy is specific to the particular 
operationalization of the expectancy notion employed in the 
present investigation. However, this seems doubtful insofar 
as the contingencies extant in this study were probably far 
more veridical than those characteristic of the vastly more 
complex non-laboratory environment. 
An alternative explanation for the expectancy discrepan­
cy may have implications which extend beyond the present 
study. There may be some semantic confusion regarding this 
concept. Expectancy is defined as the degree to which per­
formance is perceived to be contingent upon effort. This 
definition may be construed in two ways. On the one hand, 
one might assume that typically a certain amount of goal-
directed effort fails to translate into performance and thus 
expectancy is always less than unity. Conversely, one might 
reason that, despite the fact that a certain amount of effort 
is non-productive, performance remains entirely dependent on 
the remaining effort, and thus expectancy always equals 
unity. Given this dual interpretation, the discrepancy be­
tween objective and cognitive expectancy may be attributable 
to differential subject interpretation of the item designed 
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to measure this construct. 
A particularly interesting result concerns the effect of 
the treatment manipulations on the perceived effort -> reward 
contingency. Rationally one would expect the above variable 
to be a function of the interaction of the expectancy x 
instrumentality manipulation. In fact, perceived effort -> 
reward depended solely on the instrumentality manipulation. 
Again, one cannot ascertain whether this finding is specific 
to the present manipulations. Regardless, this result under­
scores the importance to the Model of measuring expectancy 
and instrumentality separately, rather than simply measuring 
effort -> reward. The latter may be only tapping subjective 
instrumentality, a point to which we shall return when 
discussing Hypotheses 4 and 4.1. 
Hypothesis 1 
The failure of the covariance analyses to reveal the 
hypothesized second-order interaction for any of the depen­
dent variables is disappointing, but not especially damaging 
to the Model. A major assumption underlying the analysis of 
covariance procedure is that no differential response exists 
between subjects exposed to a common treatment. As previous­
ly indicated, while all treatment manipulations were signifi­
cant, considerable within treatment differences were observed 
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in subiects* reports of existing contingencies. Thus, the 
above assumption was violated. 
Furthermore, Vroom's Model explicitly recognizes the ex 
istence of individual differences in the perception of envi­
ronmental contingencies. This recognition is basic to cogni 
tive theories in general, and to expectancy models in partie 
ular. The essential components of the Model are reflections 
of the manner in which an individual perceives his environ­
ment. Hence, within a treatment combination, the extent to 
which any given individual's perceptions of existing 
contingencies approximated the perceptions held by subjects 
exposed to different treatments, Vroom's Model itself would 
not predict significant treatment effects on effort and per­
formance. 
In defense of performing the covariancs analysis in vie 
of the above arguments, it should be noted that had the pre­
dicted second-order interactions been significant, the theor 
would have been strongly supported under extremely adverse 
conditions. Since it was not supported, one can justifiably 
claim that this analysis did not provide a fair test of the 
Model. In short, the covariance analysis was an expectancy 
theorist's delight in that it could either overwhelmingly 
confirm or say nothing about the viability of the model. In 
the present study the latter was the case! 
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The non-significance of the regressions of objective 
effort and performance on the Model are, in contrast, 
embarrassing to the theory. The subjects' own perceptions, 
when combined as the Model dictates, failed to predict either 
objective measure. This writer suggests that the findings 
demonstrate that the Model does not directly account for 
externally derived measures of effort or performance. Howev­
er, proponents of the Model as a predictor of objective meas­
ures might legitimately dispute the above interpretation on 
two grounds. 
First, it is probably misrepresenfcative to argue that 
the Model twice failed - first as a predictor of objective 
effort, and second as a predictor of objective performance. 
The reader will recall that effort was defined as the number 
of eguation-pairs attempted, performance as the number 
correctly answered. In fact, these two measures, while oper­
ationally distinct, were not functionally different. Because 
of the task employed and the "questionable" definition of 
effort, the high correlation between these two constructs 
(r=.93) assured the implication for the Model would be 
virtually identical when evaluated against either dependent 
measure. Given the validity of this argument, one may find 
solace in the fact that the Model has failed once, rather 
than twice! 
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a more tenable defense for the Model's failure to pre­
dict objective measures can be presented. Vroom argues that 
performance is a function of a number of second-level 
outcomes, while only one second-level outcome (cash) was 
considered in the present study. It can be argued that other 
second-level outcomes were operative, but simply ignored when 
forming the expressions dictated by the Model. Although in 
the debriefing session most Ss only indicated they were work­
ing for the cash reward, a more rigorous assessment might 
have revealed other relevant outcomes. Nevertheless, to the 
extent other outcomes were salient, the Model was not fairly 
tested. 
The above criticism becomes less problematic when 
considering the regressions of cognitive effort and perform­
ance on the Model. The fact that the Model (E x I x V) was 
the first of seven variables to enter the stepwise regression 
for both cognitive effort and performance, the fact that the 
F-values for the above term were significant for both depen­
dent variables, and the fact that the partial F-test with all 
variables entered was significant for cognitive performance 
offer strong support for the Model as defined in the present 
study. 
Discussion of effort and performance as distinct vari­
ables in the cognitive case is also justified. The correla­
tion between cognitive effort and performance (r=.35) , even 
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when corrected for the attenuation due to the unreliability 
of the measures, had less than half of their variance in 
common. 
In view of the confirmation of the Model for the cogni­
tive measures, but not for the objective measures, the argu­
ment that the omission of relevant second-order outcomes 
precipitated the failure of the Model in the objective case 
is doubtful. Such an omission would not be expected to 
differentially favor the Model in the cognitive case. 
A possible exception to the above statement occurs in 
the situation where differential method bias operates in 
favor of the Model evaluated against the cognitive dependent 
measures. A determination of the existence of differential 
method bias was therefore made in a post hoc analysis. 
Employing a procedure devised by Joreskog and Gruvaaus 
(1970), the multi-trait, multi-method correlation matrix was 
factor analyzed.10 As is shown in Table 12, there was 
actually slightly more method bias in the objective than in 
the cognitive measures. 
iQThe 12 X 12 correlation matrix was composed of six 
traits (ability, expectancy, instrumentality, valence, 
effnrt. and performance), each measured by two methods (ob­
jective and cognitive) . 
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Table 12. Factor analysis of malti-method, multi-trait 
correlation matrix: Factor matrix. 
Traits 
General A E I V Ef P 
1 0.418 0.136 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2 0. 321 0.0 0.880 0.0 0. 0 0.0 0. 0 
3 0.136 0.0 0.0 0.992 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.172 0.0 0.0 0.0 0. 635 0.0 0.0 
5 0.368 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.352 0.0 
6 0.215 0.0 0.0 0.0 0. 0 0.0 0. 421 
7 0.551 0.485 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
8 -0.052 0.0 0.427 0.0 0. 0 0.0 0.0 
9 0.062 0.0 0.0 0.944 0. 0 0.0 0.0 
10 0.245 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.781 0.0 0.0 
11 0.712 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.213 0.0 
12 0.082 0.0 0.0 0.0 0. 0 0.0 0.209 
Table 12, (Continued) 
Methods 
Cog Obi 
1 0. 153 0.0 
2 0. 282 0.0 
3 0. 172 0.0 
4 0. 516 0.0 
5 0. 225 0.0 
6 0. 225 0.0 
7 0. 0 0.642 
8 0. 0 0.173 
9 0. 0 -0.030 
10 0. 0 -0.157 
11 0. 0 0.669 
12 0. 0 0.533 
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Substantially more method variance is present in the ob-
iective measures of effort and performance (36%) than in the 
cognitive determinations of these variables (5%). The ob­
tained correlations of the Model with cognitive effort and 
performance relative to the amount of method bias present in 
the dependent measures reveal that the relationship between 
the former variables cannot be attributed solely to method 
bias. 
Furthermore, as is shown in Table 13, the correlations 
of both cognitive effort and performance with obiectively 
defined E x I x V are larger than those obtained for the pre­
ceding factor with objective effort and performance. 
Table 13. Correlation matrix of cognitive and objective 
determinations of the variables effort, performance, and 
E X I x V. 
Effort Performance 
Cog. Ob j. Cog. Obj. 
Cognitive .2367 .1 315 .2807 .1420 
E X I X V 
Objective! .1595 -.1110 . 1066 -.0713 
iThe variable E x I x V objective is the design coding 
of the ANOVA factor E x I x V. 
Thus, even when the objective dependent measures enjoy a 
method in common with the Model, the cognitive measures of 
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effort and performance are still predicted better. In sum, 
the results reported in Tables 12 and 13 lend strong support 
to the conclusion that the Model's superior prediction of 
cognitive rather than objective effort and performance is not 
simply an artifact of differential method bias. 
Hypothesis 2 
The reader will recall that the hypothesis that the 
Model better predicts effort than performance was based on 
the fact that the theory is intended to explain motivation. 
Effort is regarded as a more direct measure of motivation 
than is performance, since the latter is also moderated by 
ability and role perceptions (Porter and Lawler, 1968). 
The failure to confirm this hypothesis for the objective 
dependent measures has already been explained. The defini­
tion of objective effort in the present study was such that 
its correlation with objective performance was so large that 
there was almost no unique effort variance to explain. This 
fact, of course, reflects not on the Model, but rather on the 
failure to validly define and measure objective effort in 
this study. 
Non-confirmation of the hypothesis for cognitive effort 
and performance is more difficult to explain. The 
intercorrelation between these variables was not so large 
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that confirmation of the hypothesis was precluded, although 
it is only speculation, in this writer's opinion the lack of 
reliability of the single-item measure, combined with the in­
herent ambiguity of the effort notion, resulted in low con­
struct validity for this variable. A more definitive inter­
pretation awaits further refinements in the definition and 
measurement of cognitive effort. 
Hypothesis 3 
Although the data generated in this investigation did 
not offer overwhelming support for valence weighting, the va­
lence weighted model resulted in slightly higher correlations 
with all four dependent measures. The increase in the amount 
of cognitive performance variance explained by the weighted 
model was statistically significant. These findings are con­
sistent with Vroom's Model and cast doubt on the position 
that valence weighting should be discontinued (Blood, 1971; 
Sheard, 1971; Wannous, 1971; and Ewen, 1967). 
Furthermore, there is reason to believe that valence 
weighting was less important in the present experiment than 
might be expected in a less artificial context. Subjects 
were led to believe they would be performing a very 
monotonous task for sixty minutes. They were then asked to 
indicate the valence of either a one or five dollar reward. 
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This procedure, according to Festinger (1961) can result in 
an inflated evaluation of the valence of the one dollar rela­
tive to the five dollar reward. Insofar as this dissonance 
effect occurred, the effectiveness of the valence manipula­
tion was reduced, and the increment in explanatory power of 
the valence weighted model was attenuated. 
Hypothesis 4 
Contrary to speculation, the product of Vroom's Model 
and ability, whether the latter was measured objectively or 
coqnitively, did not increase the predictability of either 
cognitive or objective performance. The failure to confirm 
this hypothesis probably reflects less on the theory than on 
the measures of ability employed. 
As can be observed in Table 12, the loadings of both the 
cognitive and objective ability measures on the ability 
factor were much smaller than the corresponding loadings of 
any of the other measures on their respective factors. It 
appears neither measure of ability had adequate construct 
validity. Consequently, multiplying Vroom's Model by either 
ability measure simply increased the amount of error in the 
predictor. 
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Hypotheses 5 and 5.1 
Since several studies designed to test ?room*s Model 
measured the subjects' perceived effort -> reward linkage 
rather than expectancy and instrumentality separately, the 
presumed equivalence of these two approaches was examined, 
is hypothesized, effort -> reward estimates were not 
isomorphic with the product of perceived effort -> perform­
ance and performance -> reward. Vroom's Model therefore has 
not been assessed in those purported tests of the Model which 
failed to explicitly form the product of perceived expectancy 
and instrumentality (Gavin, 1970; Goodman et al., 1970; 
Hackman 5 Porter, 1968; lawler, 1968, 1966; Lawler & Porter, 
1967; and Porter & Lawler, 1968). The findings of these 
studies may have relevance for expectancy theories in gener­
al, but they cannot be offered as either support or 
disconfirmation of Vroom's propositions. 
Given the non-eguivalence of the two methods of measur­
ing perceived effort -> reward, the next logical question 
was; does incorporation in the Model of the value obtained 
from one method rather than the other result in superior pre­
diction of effort and performance? Hypothesis 5.1, a 
deduction made from Vroom's Model, predicted that better es­
timates of effort and performance result when the product of 
expectancy and instrumentality, rather than perceived effort 
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-> reward, is utilized in the Model. This hypothesis was 
confirmed. 
Two implications of the above finding should be made ex­
plicit. First, the importance of the specific method em­
ployed to measure two rationally equivalent constructs is 
underscored. The particular method used may have significant 
effects on the outcome Df an investigation, especially in a 
cognitive model which emphasizes individual differences. 
Second, the present study demonstrates that of the two dis­
tinct models (E x I x V and Effort -> Reward x V) reported in 
the literature, Vcoom's Model results in more accurate effort 
and performance prediction. 
Hypotheses 6, 6.1, and 5.2 
These hypotheses were based on the proposition that the 
explanatory power of the cognitive model is enhanced when ex­
clusively cognitive measures are utilized as both independent 
and dependent variates. The test of the hypothesis that the 
Model better predicts cognitive than objective effort and 
performance was not strictly confirmed. The partial F-tests 
on the increase in Model variance explained when cognitive in 
addition to objective dependent variates were used did not 
satisfy conventional criteria of statistical significance. 
Nevertheless, it is of importance to note that both for 
78 
effort and performance, the correlations with the cognitive 
measures were larger than with the objective. Moreover, the 
reader may recall that the results relevant to Hypothesis 1 
allowed the conclusion that the Model does predict cognitive 
effort and performance, while a similar statement for the ob-
iective measures was not supported. A strict interpretation 
of the data places the writer in the seemingly contradictory 
position of stating that a correlation which is significantly 
larger than zero is, at the same time, not significantly 
greater than a correlation which is not significantly differ­
ent from zero. The veracity of this conclusion is evident 
when one compares the null hypotheses corresponding to the 
experimental hypotheses. 
In sum, the findings do allow for interpretation. They 
are suggestive of the superiority of the cognitive model. 
The real issue now becomes why the cognitive model results in 
better prediction. 
Mendel (1971) suggested that it is misleading to indi­
cate that expectancies predict objective performance. 
Actually expectancies predict cognitive performance which, 
due to effective feedback systems in most situations, highly 
corresponds to objective performance. Let us examine the im­
plications of the findings of the present study in light of 
this position. 
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Subiects were not given any feedback regarding their 
performance during the problem-solving sessions. They were 
not told the number of equation-pairs they had solved 
correctly, nor were they given any indication of normative 
performance from which they might tacitly estimate their rel­
ative standing. This fact, in conjunction with the rather 
unusual task the subjects were given, defined an uacommonly 
ambiguous performance situation. Consequently, subjects' 
appraisals of their own performance had to be made in a situ­
ation relatively devoid of the customary external cues. The 
non-significant correlation obtained between cognitive and 
objective performance (r=.21) supports this contention. 
In contrast to earlier research, the present investiga­
tion defined an environment in which substantial discrepan­
cies existed between cognitive and objective performance. It 
thus provided an unusually good opportunity to aidress the 
question of which dependent measure the Model really pre­
dicts. The confirmation of the Model for cognitive, but not 
for objective performance strongly supports the position that 
expectancy models predict an internal estimate of perform­
ance. Previous successful predictors of objective perform­
ance were very likely caused by the correspondence of objec­
tive performance to its cognitive counterpart. 
Although, as predicted, the product of the Model vari­
ables and cognitively, rather than objectively derived 
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ability measures increased the correlation with cognitive 
effort and performance, again the difference was not signifi­
cant. This finding does not merit elaboration in view of the 
lack of construct validity for either measure of ability. 
Further investigation is necessary in order to discover which 
determination of ability more improves the Model's predictive 
power. 
Expectancies Cause Performance 
While not addressed in the form of a specific hypothe­
sis, the experimental paradigm employed in the present inves­
tigation affords conclusions regarding the causal relation­
ships between expectancies on the one hand and effort and 
performance on the other. Manipulation of expectancy, 
instrumentality, and valence resulted in subsequent changes 
in cocT-iitive effort and performance. The minimal amount of 
feedback to subjects regarding their effort and performance 
reduced the likelihood that these variables were in turn 
affecting adjustments in the Model variables. Tke stability 
of the subjects' reported expectancies from pre- to post-
measures gives support to the preceding contention. Hence, 
an assumption implicit in all prior research on expectancy 
models is herein experimentally validated; expectancies cause 
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performance.ii 
Psychometric Limitations of Expectancy Modal Evaluation 
A few general comments are warranted regarding the sta­
tistical analysis used to determine the validity of the 
Model. Because Vroom postulates that it is an interaction of 
several variables that determines performance, the appropri­
ate test of the Model must assess the degree to which the 
hypothesized interaction makes an independent and significant 
contribution to the explanation of performance variance 
beyond that of the additive (main) effects of the component 
variables (Darlington, 1968). Merely demonstrating a signif­
icant relationship between performance and the product of E x 
I X V does not represent confirmation of the Model. 
Convincing evidence for the preceding interaction is obtained 
when, with all main effects and interactions included in the 
regression eguation, the partial F-test on the hypothesized 
interaction is statistically significant. When this occurs, 
as it did in the case of cognitive performance, the interac­
tion is accounting for variance which is not explained by any 
iiThe author wishes to acknowledge the contribution of 
Leroy Wolins for defining the problem and its ramifications 
for an evaluation of Troom's Model. 
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of the remaining additive or multiplicative combinations of 
the Model variables. 
a very difficult interpretative problem exists however, 
when significance for the predicted interaction is not ob­
tained. In this event, though no support for the Model is 
provided, the evidence cannot be forthwith regarded as 
disproof of the theory. 
The problem resides in the psychometric limitations of 
the cognitive measures.12 There exist three sources of vari­
ance which can potentially contribute to an individual's ob­
tained score on each measure: a) his true score on that con­
struct, b) a scale factor, and c) error. The error does not 
constitute a major difficulty given the validity of the as­
sumption that error is randomly and independently distribut­
ed. However, the scale factor is a property of the instru­
ment itself. It contributes systematic bias to our measures; 
its magnitude is typically unknown. Conseguently, when prod­
ucts of the cognitive variables are formed, the scale factors 
also receive non-zero weights in the expression defining the 
combined variables. Thus, when the Model fails to operate as 
specified, the problem may be that the interaction term has 
izThe writer does not intend to discount the cross-lagged 
and dynamic correlational evidence of this causal relation­
ship provided by Lawler (1968) . 
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not been correctly operationallzed, rather than that the 
theory is invalid. 
Although the general problem is not limited to the 
present theory, it is particularly salient here for two 
reasons. First, the variables which must be measured are 
cognitive. This fact severely limits the variety of measure­
ment strategies one might employ to tap the constructs. In 
practice, some type of paper and pencil attitude question­
naire is invariably used. To the extent scale factors have a 
significant influence on observed scores whenever question­
naires are administered, the problem is especially difficult 
to circumvent. Second, the theory hypothesizes that it is a 
three-way interaction that explains performance. Consequent­
ly, the number of potential sources for contamination of the 
interaction is larger relative to a theory which specifies 
fewer variables or less complex interrelationships as per­
formance determinants. This differential influence of scale 
factors when measuring the cognitive variables may indeed 
explain the varied success Vroom's Model has enjoyed in prior 
research, as well as the lack of progress in refinement of 
the theory during the past eight years. 
The above problem can, in one sense, be interpreted as a 
general criticism of Vroom's Model. Empirical veriflability 
is a major criterion of a good theory (Underwood, 1957) . 
Yet, to the extent that the influence of scale factors in our 
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cognitive measures escapes both quantification and control, 
the theory is not strictly testable. 
In defense of formulations such as Vroom's, it can be 
argued that the complexity of the behavior for which an ex­
planation is sought might reasonably demand a complex theo­
retical model, i.e., the actual relationships among the 
behavioral determinants may be complex. We must not 
dogmatically avoid researching behavior, or a theory which 
seeks its explanation simply because our measurement 
technology at a particular point in time does not permit un­
ambiguous research conclusions. Undoubtedly, much can be 
learned from imperfect tests of a theory's validity, while at 
the same time providing impetus for the development of more 
sophisticated evaluative techniques. 
The reality of the present research bespeaks this writ­
er's position relative to the above issue. More important 
however are the implications of this position in conjunction 
with the recognition of the measurement problem previously 
discussed for the interpretation of the results obtained in 
the present investigation. The reader may have noticed that 
with regard to several hypotheses, results which 
approximated, but did not reach conventional levels of sta­
tistical significance, were interpreted nevertheless as evi­
dence supporting the related hypotheses. This support is 
justified on several grounds. First, in view of the scale 
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factor problem, the partial F-tests employed represent ex­
tremely conservative tests of the hypotheses. Second, in 
those instances where non-significant partial F-tests were 
regarded as support for an hypothesis, the actual probability 
of obtaining an F of that magnitude on the basis of chance 
alone was extremely small. Third, frequently the hypotheses 
were evaluated with respect to several different dependent 
measures, all of which revealed data consistent with the con­
clusions drawn. In short, our confidence in a conclusion is 
greater when it is based on several tests, each of which sug­
gests an unlikely result on the basis of chance alone. This 
is especially so ehen we consider that the probability of the 
simultaneous occurrence of several unlikely events (due to 
chance) is much lower than that of each individual event. 
Finally, throughout the potential efficacy of the Model was 
undermined insofar as outcomes other than the cash reward 
were motivating task performance, but for the sake of experi­
mental simplicity, were not considered in the present study. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Conclusions relevant to three major issues concerning 
Vroora's Model were reached in the present study. Host impor­
tant is the finding that the three-way interaction of 
expectancy, instrumentality, and valence specified by the 
Model has some validity as a description of the motivational 
antecedents of performance. Next, the Model actually 
explains cognitive performance, not objective performance as 
heretofore advertised. Finally, the assumption that 
expectancies cause performance was validated. 
Several secondary issues were also elucidated. It is 
apparent that effort -> reward expectancies are not equiva­
lent to the product of expectancy and instrumentality. 
Moreover, the Model has considerably less explanatory power 
when effort -> reward expectancies are employed. As pre­
scribed by the Model, valence weighting does enhance the 
ability of the theory to explain performance. Last, with 
reference to the inadequate measurement of ability, no infor­
mation was obtained regarding the advisability of 
incorporating ability, whether measured cognitively or 
objectively, into the Model. 
The pragmatic implications of these findings do not re­
quire extensive elaboration. At the very least, performance 
motivation may be understood in terms of the interaction of 
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those variables specified by the Model. The evidence for a 
causal relationship between the Model variables and perform­
ance offers the possibility of substantial control over the 
latter. In addition, the suggestion that the Model predicts 
cognitive rather than objective performance underscores the 
importance as well as the manipulative potential of varia­
tions in the performance feedback system. 
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APPENDIX a 
EQUATION BOOKLET 
1) 7X + 7 + 2 " 
5X - 2 - 7 -
3) 7X + 0 + 7 = 
iX - 3 - 5 = 
5) 3X - 7 + 2 -
9X - 5 + 7 = 
7) 9X + 4 - 5 -
9X - 5 + 8 -
9) 4X + 3 - 2 -
5X - 2 + 6 -
11) 2X - 9 - 0 -
9X - 0 + 7 = 
13) IX - 5 - 3 = 
9X + 7 - 4 -
15) 4X + 5 + 9 -
6X + 7 - 4 -
17) 4X - 1 + 9 -
2.x + 2 + 9 -
19) 2X - 2 + 5 -
ax - 3 - 2 -
21) 7X - 0 + 4 -
9X - 0 - 4 -
PRETEST 
95 
2) 4X + 8 - 2 
7X - 8 + 0 
4) 6X - 0 - 5 
7X - 5 + 0 
6) 6X + 5 - 9 
3X - 3 - 9 
8) 4X - 6 + 3 
6 X  + 6 - 5  
10) 6X + 6 + 5 
IX + 0 - 2 
12) 3X - 6 + 2 
3X - 0 - 0 
14) 5X - 5 - 5 
6X + 7 - 7 
16) IX - 1 - 0 
4X - 3+ 7 
18) 7X + 0 + 6 
5X + 7 - 1 
20) 8X + 8 + 6 
4X + 6 - 2 
22) 3X + 6 - 3 
8X - 8 - 8 
PRETEST 
96 
23) 5X - 5 + 3 " 
5X - 7 - 0 -
25) IX - 4 - 5 -
3X - 2 + 0 = 
27) IX - 0 - 9 -
9X - 7 + 1 -
29) 9X - 7 + 6 -
3X - 5 - 5 -
24) 8X + 4 + 7 
4X + 1 + 9 
26) 7X + 7 + 2 
SX + 2 + 8 
28) IX + 8 + 6 
9X - 0 + 6 
30) 2X - Z - 6 
4X + 5 - 4 
PERIOD TWO 
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1) 8X - 0 + 4 • 
a x  * 8 * 8 -
2} 2X - 0 + 2 
9X + 6 + 1 
3) 9X - 6 - 2 -
5X - 7 - a -
4) 3X - 7 + 1 
9X + 3 - 5 
5) 3X - 0 + 0 -
8X + 4 + 8 -
6) 3X + 2 - 9 
7X - 8 + 4 
7} 3X - 3 + 9 -
6X + 2 - 3 -
8) 7X + 3 + 9 
9X + 3 + 3 
9) 5X - 2 - 6 -
8X - 8 - 2 -
10) SX - 9 + 7 
6X - 1 + 4 
11) 6X - 1 - Û • 
IX - 6 + 2 -
12) 3X - 4 + 3 
3X - 9 - 9 
13) 8X - 8 - 9 -
4X - 9 + 5 -
14) 4X - 6 - 2 
6X - 5 + 2 
15) 4X - 9 - 5 • 
ex + 9 - 1 -
17) IX - 8 - 8 -
9X + a - 9 -
16) IX + 7 - 8 
8X + 2 - 1 
18) 9X + 8 - 3 
4X - 2 + 8 
PERIOD TWO 
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19) 4X + 2 + 8 
8X - 3 + 6 
20) 4X - 6 + 8 
7X - 8 + 8 
21) 5X + 0 + 6 
7X - 6 - 3 
22) 8X + 4 - 3 
3X - 4 - 5 
23) 6X - 8 + 6 
4 X  + 4 -  2  
24) 5X - 4 - 9 
7X + 3 - 0 
25) 3X + 1 - 5 
2X - 7 - 3 
26) 7X - 1 - 2 
7 X  +  7 - 8  
27) 9X + 3 - 6 
8X + 4 + 1 
28) 5X + 6 - 6 
8X - 4 - 7 
29) 6X + 9 - 6 
2 X  - 2  +  7  
30) 6X - 1 - 2 
8X - 5 - 2 
31) IX + 8 + 8 
IX + 8- 0 
32) 2X - 5 - 5 
IX + 5 + 6 
33) IX - 3 - 0 
4X + 6 + 4 
34) SX + 0 - 6 
3X - 0 + 7 
35) 2X - 1 + 5 
7X - 4 - 7 
36) 3X - 8 + 3 
9X - 2 - 6 
PERIOD TWO 
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37) 5X - 5 + 3 -
2X - 9 + 3 -
38) 4X - 9 + 1 
8X - 8 + 1 
39) 4X - 9 - 1 -
2X - 8 + 2 -
40) 5X - 0 - 4 
4 X - 9  -  5  
41) 6X - 3 + 9 -
8X + 7 + I -
42) SX - 3 - 2 
8X - 8 - 2 
43) 9X + 9 + 4 " 
2X - 8 - 0 -
44) 7X + 7 - 8 
3X + 6 + 8 
45) 3X • 1 - 0 -
4X + 5 - 3 -
46) IX - 4 + 4 
9X - 5 + 8 
47) 9X - 1 + 6 -
6X - 4 - 6 • 
48) 9X - 4 - 9 
4X + 5 - 9 
49) IX + 2 - 3 • 
7X + 5 + 2 -
50) 6X - 2 - 4 
7X + 3 + 1 
51) 3X + 0 + 3 -
5X - 2 - 2 -
52) 2X - 1 - 7 
4X + 9 - 0 
53) 8X - 6 - 6 -
4X - 2 - 1 -
54) 4X - 5 + 6 
5% + 0 - 8 
PERIOD TWO 
100 
55) 3X + 8 + 3 
9X + 4 - 9 
56) 6X + 5 - 3 
2X + 6 - 9 
57) IX - 0 + 6 = 
IX + 5 + 1 " 
58) 8X + 6 + 1 
4X + 9 + 4 
59) 4X - 4 + 6 = 
7X + 3 - 8 • 
60) 7X + 6 + 8 
9X + 1 + 8 
61) IX - 6 + 3 -
2X - 8 - 4 -
62) 2X - 7 + 9 
5X + 4 + 4 
63) 7X + 6 + 5 -
9X + 0 - 6 -
64) 5X - 3 - 6 
8X •}• 9 - 4 
65) IX + 0 - 9 
2X - 5 - 1 
66) 6X + 3 + 6 
4X - 8 + 9 
67) 2X - 3 + 9 -
2X - 5 + 6 -
68) 6X + 8 - 7 
5 X + 4  + 6  
69) IX - 8 - 6 -
8X + 9 + 0 -
70) 2X - 9 + 8 
9X + 7 - 0 
71) 2X - 9 + 8 
6X + 8 - 7 
72) 5X + 4 + 6 
4X - 8 + 9 
73) 6X + 3 + 6 = 
IX + 0 -9 + 
75) 8X + 9 - 4 -
9X + 0 - 6 -
77) 2X - 5 - 1 -
7X + 3 + 1 » 
79) 2X - 3 + 9 -
2X - 1 - 7 • 
81) 2X - 5 + 6 -
4X + 9 - 0 -
83) IX - 8 - 6 -
4X - 5 + 6 -
85) 8X + 9 + 0 -
5X + 0 - 8 -
87) 6X + 5 - 3 -
3X + 8 + 3 • 
89) 2X + 6 - 9 -
9X + 4 - 9 -
PERIOD TWO 
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74) 8X + 6 + 1 
IX + 0 - 8 
76) 4X + 9 + 4 
IX + 5 + 1 
78) 7X + 6 + 8 
4X - 4 + 6 
80) 9X + 1 + 8 
7 X  +  3 - 8  
82) 2X - 7 + 9 
IX - 6 + 3 
84) 5X + 4 + 8 
2X - 8 - 4 
86) SX - 3 - 6 
7X + 6 + 5 
88) 8X + 9 - 4 
I  
9X + 0 - 6 
90) 9X - 3 + 4 
• 
5X - 4 - 3 
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APPENDIX B 
ANSWER SHEET 
.DATE. 
F I R S T  M I D D L E  
CITY 
AGE. .SEX. 
4AME OF TEST OR QUESTIONNAIRE: 
GRADE OR CLASS. 
#  
DIRECTIONS: Read each question and i ts numbered answers.  
When you have decided which answer is  appropr iote,  b lacken 
the corresponding space on th is sheet with o No. 2 penci l .  
Make your mark as long as the pair of lines, and completely 
fill the area between the pair of lines. If you change your 
mind, erase your first mark COMPLETELY. Please make no 
Stray morks; they may be scored erroneously. 
1  
0  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  
2  
0  
3 0 I  2 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  4 0 
5 0 2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  6 0 
7 0  2 3  4  5  6  7  6  9  8 0 
9 0  2 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  1 0  0 
1 1  0 2 3  4  5  6  7  6  9  1 2  0 
13 0  2 3  4  5  6  7  8 9  14 0 
15 0  2  3  4 5  6 7  8  9  16 0  
17 0  2  3  4  5  6  7  6 9  1 8  0  
19 
0  2 3  4  5  6  7  8 9  
2 0  
0 
0  2 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  0 
2 1  2 2  
23 
0  2 3  4  5  6  7  8 Q 
24 
0 
25 0 2  3  4  6  7  8 9  26 0 
27 
0 2  3  4  6 7  8 9  
2 8  
0  
29 0  2  3  4  6  7  8  9  30 0  
31 0  2 3  4  t 6  7  8 9  32 0 
33 
0 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9  0 
34 
35 
0 2  3  4  5  6  7  6 9  
36 
0  
37 0 1 2  3  4  5  6  7  6  9  38 0 
39 
0 1 2 3  4  S  6  7  6  9  
40 
0 
41 
0 1 2  3  4 S  /> 7  a  9  0  
42 
43 
0  Î  2  3  4  5  6  7  B  9  0  
44 
45 0  1 2  3  4  5  6  7  a  9  46 0  
47 
0  1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9  0  
48 
49 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  
50 
51 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9  52 0 
0  1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9  0  
53 54 
55 
0  } 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9  0  
56 
0  1 2  3  4  S  6  7  8 9  0  
57 58 
59 
0  1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9  0  
60 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 9  0  
6 1  62 
0  1 2  3  4  5  C  7  8 9  0  
63 6 4  
0  1 2  3  4  5  6  7  y  9 0  
65 66 
0  1 2  3  4  5  6  7 '  8 ' 9 0 
67 68 d ! 2  3 "  4 5 "  ' 6  '  '  7  • a " "9"  ' (5 
69 70 
IC 3 
0  J  
0  1  
0  I  
0  1  
0  !  
0  1  
0  !  
0  I  
0  1  
M  O R  
MAJOR. 
iDENTiF 
3  
3  
3  
3  
3  
3  
3  
3  
3  
3  
DATBjQFTBIRTW.: 
ICATION NUMBER 
4 5 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2  
2 
2  
2  
2  
2  
2  
2  
2  
2  
2  
2  
2  
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2  
2  
2 "  
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
5  
5  
5  
5  
5  
5  
5  
5  
5 
5  
5  
5  
5  
5  
5  
5  
5  
5  
7  
7  
7  
7  
7  
7  
7  
7  
7  
7  
7  
7  
7  
7  
7  
7  
7  
7  
7  
7  
7  
7  
7  
7  
7  
5  6  7  B  9  
5  6  7  8  9  
5  6  7  8  9  
5  6  7  Q  9  
5  6  7 8  9  
5  6  7 8  9  
5  '  6  7  8  9  
5  6  7  8  9  
5  6  7  à '  9  
9  " 6  7  • •  Ô '  
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APPENDIX C 
INPUT CARDS 
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In an eqostloo-pair, if the tqijper answer is larger or equal 
to the lower, subtract the lower from the npper. If the 
lower answer iw larger, add the two answers together. 
of tSe inputs below are INCORRECT 
Ô) 3 1) ^ 
2) / 3)_2L 
4) é 5) f 
«V 7) Û ' 
8) cZ 9) ^ 
In an «qoation-pair, if the upper answer is larger or equal 
to the lower, subtract the lower from the tgqper. If the 
lower answer is larger, add tha two answers together. 
A/ of the inputs below are XNOORIUSCT 
0) - 3  1) % 
2) f 3) 7 
4) ^ 5) 8 
6i H 7) 0 
9) 5 
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APPENDIX D 
PRELIHINABY QOESTIONNAIBE 
PRELIMINARY QUESTIONNAIRE 
107 
Please answer each of the questions below thoughtfully and carefully. 
If any questions are the least bit unclear, ask the experimenter for 
clarification before attempting an answer. 
I believe that the total number of equation-pairs I will be zible to solve 
correctly during the next hour is ? % determined by the amount of effort 
I personally put forth- On t.ie scale below, place an "x" at a point which 
best reflects your feeling. 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
a. 
not at all partially entirely 
determined determined determined 
2. Assuming our team does make the cutoff and therefore gets to reach into the 
poker chip bag, I believe our chances of pulling out a cash winning chip 
are ? out of 100. On the scale below, place an "x" at a point which 
best reflects your feeling. 
Ï ÎÔ 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
I 1 1 I I I I I . I • I I I I 
no chance possible absolutely 
at all certain 
3. I believe the probabiIity that I will actually receive the cash prize is 
? % determined by the amount of effort I put forth during the next hour. 
On the scale below, place an "x" at a point which best reflects your feeling. 
Ï ÏÔ 20 3p 40 5Ô 60 70 80 90 99 
J 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I I JL_ , 
not at all partially entirely 
determined determined determined 
4. On the scale below, place an "x" at a point which best reflects the degree 
to which you value the cash prize offered in this experiment. 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
'  I  .  *  . 1 . .  I .  I  I  I  . J  
not at all moderately very highly 
valued valued valued 
-2- 108 
5. I believe my ability to solve equation-pairs is greater than ? % of the 
psychology students who participate in this experiment. On the scale 
below, place an "x" at a point which best reflects your feeling. 
1 10 20 30 
I 
40 50 60 
1 1 1 
70 
1 
80 
1 
90 99 
: » 
much 
less 
average 
ability 
much 
greater 
6. Consider r.he to Lai amount of <;ffort you could possibly put into solving 
tho equation-pairs. What per cent of this maximum effort do you expect 
you will actually put forth during the next hour? On the scale below, 
place an "x" at a point which best reflects your feeling. 
1 10 
1 1 
20 30 
f 
40 50 60 
1 1 » 
70 
• 
80 
1 
90 99 
1 t 
least effort 
possible 
moderate 
effort 
roost effort 
possible 
7. Do you intend to try for any particular goal or score? Yes No 
8. If you checked "yes" in response to question 7, what is your goal? 
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POST QOESTIONNaiSE 
no 
FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. I believe the total number of equation-pairs I have been able to solve 
correctly thus far has been ? % determined by the amount of effort I 
personally have put forth. On the scale below, place an "x" at a point 
which best roflects your feeling. 
1 10 20 
1 
30 40 50 60 
1 1 1 
70 
1 
80 
I 
90 99 
1 1 
not at all 
determined ^ 
partially 
determined 
entirely 
determined 
2. Assuming our team has performed well enough to make the cutoff and therefore 
gets to reach into the poker chip bag, I believe our chances of pulling out 
a cash winning chip are ? out of 100. On the scale below, place an "x" 
at a point which best reflects your feeling. 
1 10 
1 • 
20 
1 
30 
1 
40 50 60 
i 1 1 
70 
1 
80 
I 
90 99 
• • 
no chance 
at all 
possible absolutely 
certain 
3. I believe the probability that 1 will actually receive the cash prize is 
? % determined by the amount of effort I put forth during the equation 
solving sessions. On the scale below, place an "x" at a point which best 
reflects your feeling. 
1 10 
1 1 
20 
» 
30 
1 
40 50 60 
1 1 1 
70 
' 
80 
1 
90 99 
1 , t 
not at all 
determined 
partially 
determined 
entirely 
determined 
4- On the scale below, placo an "x" at a point which best reflects the 
degree to which you value the cash prize offered in this experiment. 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 ttO 50 95 
I. . ,1 I I I I I I I I 
not at all moderately vary highly 
valued valued valued 
-2-
m 
5. Consider the total amount of effort you could possibly have put into solving 
the equation-pairs during just the last session. What per cent of this 
maximum effort would you say you actually have put forth? On the scale 
below, place an "x" at a point which best reflects your feeling. 
1 10 
• ' 
20 
1 
30 
• 
40 50 60 
1 1 1 
70 80 
1 
90 99 
least effort 
possible 
moderate 
effort 
most effort 
possible 
6. I br-lifiVf; my ahi 11 ty to solve equation-pairs is greater than ? % of the 
psychology students who participate in this experiment. On the scale below, 
place an "x" at a point which best reflects your feeling. 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
1 , 1 1 • 1 1 , 
much 
less 
average 
ability 
much 
greater 
7. Relative to the second-session performance of other participants, I believe 
the number of equatlnn-nairs I solved correctly during the last session 
places me at the ? percentile- On the scale below, place an "x" at a 
point which best reflects your feeling. 
1 10 20 30 40 
1 
50 60 70 80 90 
' 
99 
many 
fewer 
average 
number 
many 
more 
» 
8. If it was oxtromrly important, to you to have solved as many equation-pairs 
during the last session as was humanly possible, how many more equation-
pairs do you think you could have solved? On the scale below, place an "x" 
at a point on the scale which best reflects your feeling. 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
• • • ' ' ' ' » . • I , I I 
no half again twice 
more as many as many 
9. On the scale below, place an "x" at a point which best reflects your feeling 
about the number of equation-pairs you solved correctly during the last session. 
1 10 
1 I 
20 
f 
30 
1 
40 50 60 
1 1 1 
70 
1 
80 
1 
90 99 
1 1 
poor 
performance 
average 
performance 
excellent 
performance 
10. Have you been trying to attain any particular goal or score? Yes No 
11. If you checked "yes" in response to question 10, what is your goal? 
12. If your team does not make the cutoff, will it embarrass you? Yes No 
13. Relative to yourself, how well do you think your partner has performed? 
On the scale below, place an "x" at a point which best reflects your feeling. 
1 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 99 
J I I I I 1 I I I I !_ 
much about the much 
poorer same better 
